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WHY NOT PRIVACY BY DEFAULT? 
Lauren E. Willis∗ 
We live in a Track-Me world, one from which opting out is often not possible. Firms collect reams of data about all 
of us, quietly tracking our mobile devices, our web surfing, and our email for marketing, pricing, product development, 
and other purposes. Most consumers both oppose tracking and want the benefits tracking can provide. In response, 
policymakers have proposed that consumers be given significant control over when, how, and by whom they are tracked 
through a system of defaults (i.e., “Track-Me” or “Do-Not-Track”) from which consumers can opt out. 
The use of a default scheme is premised on three assumptions. First, that for consumers with weak or conflicted 
preferences, any default chosen will be “sticky,” meaning that more consumers will stay in the default position than 
would choose it if  an affirmative action were required to reach the position. Second, that those consumers with a fairly 
strong preference for the opt-out position—and only those consumers—will opt out. Third, that where firms oppose 
the default position, they will be forced to explain it in the course of trying to convince consumers to opt out, resulting 
in well-informed decisions by consumers. 
This article demonstrates that for tracking defaults, these assumptions may not consistently hold. Past experience 
with the use of defaults in policymaking teaches that Track-Me defaults are likely to be too sticky, Do-Not-Track 
defaults are likely to be too slippery, and neither are likely to be information-forcing.  
These conclusions should inform the “Do-Not-Track” policy discussions actively taking place in the U.S., in the 
E.U., and at the World Wide Web Consortium. They also cast doubt on the privacy and behavioral economics literatures 
that advocate the use of “nudges” to improve consumer decisions about privacy. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
We live in a Track-Me
1 world, one from which opting out is, as a practical matter, often not 
possible. Firms collect reams of data about us for marketing, pricing, product development, and 
other uses. Sometimes we are knowing participants in the first stage of this process—a firm asks for 
information and we provide it, knowing roughly how that firm will use it. But much data collection 
is passive, invisible, and performed without explicit consent. We are rarely aware of the identities of 
passive data collectors or downstream users to whom our data may be transferred. And neither we 
nor the firms collecting data today know all the future uses to which our data may be put. Collection 
of data on the websites people visit, the content of their emails, and the movements of their mobile 
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1 This article uses “Track-Me” and “Do-Not-Track” to avoid the indeterminacy of “Opt-In” and “Opt-Out,” and uses 
“tracking” in a colloquial sense to refer to all forms of personal data collection and use for commercial purposes, online 
and off. For a discussion of Do-Not-Track as a technical protocol, see DO NOT TRACK—UNIVERSAL WEB TRACKING 
OPT OUT, http://donottrack.us/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2013). Collection and use of personal data for law enforcement 
purposes is beyond the scope of this article.  WHY NOT PRIVACY BY DEFAULT?  11/4/13 12:50 PM 
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phones have garnered the most media attention,
2 but as tracking technologies (e.g., facial recognition 
programs, eye tracking systems and geolocation sensors) become cheaper and more accurate, the 
amount of data collected passively and the uses to which it will be put will only increase.
3 
Although  preferences  for  information  privacy  vary,  wide  majorities  of  people  both  express 
opposition to the extent of this data collection and have taken some steps to avoid being tracked.
4  
They wish to avoid uses of their data that they experience as harmful (e.g., identity theft, price 
discrimination, negative employment consequences) as well as the more amorphous costs of a lack 
of  privacy,  the  “creepy”  feeling  of  being  watched  that  creates  a  decreased  space  for  individual 
experimentation  and  reflection  key  to  personal  growth.
5 Yet  people  also  want  the  benefits  that 
tracking can provide, such as online socializing and access to online content.
6   
In  response,  policymakers  have  proposed  that  consumers  be  given  significant  control  over 
when, how, and by whom they are tracked through a system of defaults (i.e., “Track-Me” or “Do-
Not-Track”) from which consumers can opt out.
7 Ostensibly, this “notice and choice” regime is 
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2 Most websites track users, collecting information such as access time, visit duration, mouse movements and clicks. See 
Andrew  Couts,  Top  100  Websites:  How  They  Track  Your  Every  Move  Online,  DIGITAL  TRENDS  (Aug.  30,  2012), 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/top-100-websites-how-are-they-tracking-you/ (finding that the top 100 websites all 
track users in some way). Some providers of “free” email scan users’ email text. See, e.g., John Pallatto, Google Defends 
Scanning  E-Mail  for  Ad  Links,  EWEEK  (Apr.  23,  2004),  http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Messaging-and-
Collaboration/Google-Defends-Scanning-EMail-for-Ad-Links/ (explaining that Google scans email text of Gmail users 
for targeted ad purposes). Mobile data is often tracked through applications or by cell carriers themselves, then sold to 
third  parties.  See,  e.g.,  Olga  Kharif  &  Scott  Moritz,  Cell  Carriers  Sell  Users’  Tracking  Data  in  $5.5  B  Market, 
DELAWAREONLINE  (June  13,  2013), 
http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20130613/BUSINESS08/306130050/Cell-carriers-sell-users-tracking-data-5-5-
B-market.  
3 See generally What They Know, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/public/page/what-they-know-digital-privacy.html (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2013). 
4  See,  e.g.,  Lee  Rainie  et  al.,  Anonymity,  Privacy,  and  Security  Online,  PewResearchCenter  Report  at  8, 
pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Anonymity-online.aspx (Sept. 5, 2013) (86% of internet users have “taken at least one 
step to try to mask their behavior or avoid being tracked”); Chris Crum, Googler: Nobody Wants to Be Tracked Online, 
WEBPRONEWS  (Apr.  2,  2012),  http://www.webpronews.com/googler-nobody-wants-to-be-tracked-online-2012-04 
(finding that nearly 85% of users think a business should not be able to track consumer activity on the business’s 
website, even anonymously). 
5  See,  e.g.,  Martha  C.  White,  Orbitz  Shows  Higher  Prices  to  Mac  Users,  TIME,  June  26,  2012, 
http://business.time.com/2012/06/26/orbitz-shows-higher-prices-to-mac-
users/#ixzz2iC0bd6Dehttp://business.time.com/2012/06/26/orbitz-shows-higher-prices-to-mac-users/  (describing 
negative  consumer  reaction  to  perceived  price  discrimination  based  on  personal  information);  ANITA  ALLEN, 
UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? (2011) (arguing that privacy is often necessary for personal dignity, trust, 
and reputation, all of which preserve individual freedom to make one’s own social, economic and political choices).  
6 See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy In The Age Of Big Data: A Time For Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 63 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/big-data (listing significant  
benefits currently produced by tracking).  
7 See, e.g., The Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2013, S. 418, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposed legislation which would require 
the  FTC  to  create  an  enforceable  “mechanism  by  which  an  individual  can  simply  and  easily  indicate  whether  the 
individual prefers to have personal information collected by providers of online services, including by providers of 
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motivated by a desire to satisfy diverse privacy preferences. Such an approach has deep normative 
roots; privacy itself has been conceptualized as a right of individuals “to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”
8 Conveniently 
for  policymakers,  the  use  of  tracking  defaults  in  privacy  policy  also  dodges  the  judgment  calls 
required to resolve the conflict between people’s desire for information privacy and their desire for 
tracking’s benefits.
9  
Contested in policy circles today is whether to set Track-Me or Do-Not-Track as the default.
10 
Three key assumptions taken from the behavioral economics literature underlie the debate.
11 First, 
that any default chosen will be “sticky,” meaning that more consumers stay with the default than 
would explicitly choose to do so if forced to make a choice.
12 Second, that those consumers with a 
	 ﾠ
mobile applications and services”); THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD, 11–22 
(Feb. 2012) (proposing a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, which includes “Consumers have a right to exercise control 
over what personal data companies collect from them and how they use it.”).  
8 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). This focus on individual choice may be misplaced, regardless of 
whether meaningful choice is possible. Social welfare and individual preferences about privacy may not be well-aligned, 
and if so, policymakers ought to make policy based on the social costs and benefits of tracking rather than based on a 
quest to satisfy preferences. But that debate is beyond the scope of this article. 
9 Cf.  JAMES P. NEHF, OPEN BOOK: THE FAILED PROMISE  OF INFORMATION PRIVACY  IN AMERICA  103-04  (2012) 
(explaining difficulty policymakers have with resolving the incommensurability of the costs and benefits of privacy). 
10 A third possibility is forced choice, meaning consumers could not continue with the online or off-line activity from 
which data will be collected without affirmatively making choices about tracking. Under a forced choice regime, a 
consumer could not enter a store that tracks cellphones, view a website that tracks browsing activity, use a credit card at 
a retailer that tracks customer purchases or open a mobile device application that collects personal data, without first 
deciding whether to be tracked. Forced choice is largely ignored in policy discussions, perhaps because such frequent 
decisions would be burdensome, or because most consumers would respond with a reflexive “yes” click so as to move 
along in their daily activities rather than engage in reflective decisionmaking.  
11 A fourth key assumption is that defaults imposed by law can and will be enforced. These assumptions may be naive, 
as the EU, Israeli, and, in the U.S., the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) experiences suggest. See, e.g., 
Maurizio Borghi et al., Online Data Processing Consent Under EU Law: A Theoretical Framework and Empirical Evidence from the 
UK,  21 INT’L. J. L. & INFO. TECH. 109 (Summer 2013) (finding widespread noncompliance with EU and UK law 
requiring user consent prior to data collection); Michael Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, Does Law Matter Online? Empirical 
Evidence  on  Privacy  Law  Compliance,  17  MICH.  TELECOMM.  &  TECH.  L.  REV.  337  (2011)  (finding  widespread 
noncompliance with Israeli law requiring notice to users about data collection); EUROPEAN NETWORK AND INFO. SEC. 
AGENCY,  PRIVACY  CONSIDERATIONS  OF  ONLINE  BEHAVIOURAL  TRACKING,  16  (Oct.  2012), 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/library/deliverables/privacy-considerations-of-online-
behavioural-tracking (finding that EU law requiring user consent prior to tracking is not being enforced by the EU or 
member countries); Danah Boyd, Why Parents Help their Children Lie to Facebook About Age: Unintended Consequences of the 
‘Children’s  Online  Privacy  Protection  Act’,  16  FIRST  MONDAY  11  (2011), 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3850 (finding widespread circumvention of COPPA’s default 
that websites cannot collect information about children unless their parents opt out). To present the strongest case for 
tracking defaults, this Article assumes they would be enforceable and enforced, but nonetheless finds that tracking 
defaults are unlikely to achieve policymakers’ professed aims.  
12 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default Rules: A Triptych 9 (Harvard 
Law  Sch.  Working  Paper  Series,  May  19,  2013)  (working  paper),  available  at 
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preference for the opt-out position —and only those consumers—will opt out.
13 Third, that where 
firms oppose the default position, they will be forced to explain it in the course of trying to convince 
consumers to opt out, resulting in well-informed decisions by consumers.
14 In behavioral economics 
parlance, tracking defaults are expected to be sticky “policy defaults” (selected with an aim to nudge 
people with weak or unformed preferences toward the default position)
15 or information-forcing 
“penalty defaults” (selected with an aim to educate people about the default and opt-out positions).
16   
This Article demonstrates one reason why the debate over tracking defaults is misguided – the 
assumptions underlying the use of defaults in policymaking are unlikely to hold in the personal data 
tracking context. Defaults can be too sticky (meaning that consumers who, were they well-informed, 
would prefer to opt out, instead stick with the default) or too slippery (meaning that consumers 
who, were they well-informed, would prefer the default position, instead opt out), and are not always 
information-forcing. Defaults favored by firms are often surrounded by a powerful campaign to 
keep consumers there, but defaults set contrary to firm interests can be met with an equally powerful 
campaign to drive consumers to opt out. Firms can bolster the mechanisms behind the inertia that 
leads consumers to stick with defaults, or can weaken them to induce consumers to opt out. Rather 
than forcing firms to facilitate consumer exercise of informed choice, many defaults leave firms with 
opportunities to play on consumer biases or confuse consumers into sticking with or opting out of 
the default.  
Thus, whether a tracking default is sticky or slippery, informative or uninformative will depend 
on whether firms’ interests are aligned with the default. Firms can increase or decrease transaction 
barriers  to  opting  out  and  frame  the  issue  to  influence  consumer  decisions.  To  counter  firm 
manipulation,  the  law  can  impose  “altering  rules”
17—rules  governing  the  process  by  which 
consumers can opt out--and “framing rules”
18—rules governing the presentation of the default to 
consumers. But normative, legal, and practical constraints limit altering and framing rules, and the 
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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171343 (“In the domain of privacy on the Internet, a great deal 
depends on the default rule.”). 
13	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠJay	 ﾠP.	 ﾠKesan	 ﾠ&	 ﾠRajiv	 ﾠC.	 ﾠShah,	 ﾠSetting	 ﾠSoftware	 ﾠDefaults:	 ﾠPerspectives	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠLaw,	 ﾠComputer	 ﾠScience	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠ
Behavioral	 ﾠEconomics,	 ﾠ82	 ﾠNOTRE	 ﾠDAME	 ﾠL.	 ﾠREV.	 ﾠ583,	 ﾠ633	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠ(suggesting	 ﾠpenalty	 ﾠdefaults	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprivacy	 ﾠsettings	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
protect	 ﾠuninformed	 ﾠusers	 ﾠyet	 ﾠallow	 ﾠ“well-ﾭ‐informed	 ﾠindividuals”	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout). 
 
14 See, e.g., Lilian Edwards & Ian Brown, Data Control and Social Networking: Irreconcilable Ideas?, in HARBORING DATA: 
INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW AND THE CORPORATION 22 (A. Matwyshyn ed., 2009) (“A general rule that privacy 
settings be set at the most privacy-friendly setting when a profile is first set up . . . would inform all users that privacy 
settings do exist, and force them to learn how to make use of them before they moved on to networking . . . .”). 
15 See, e.g., Craig R. M. McKenzie et al., Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 414, 414 (2006).  
16 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,  
91 (1989); see also Janger & Schwartz, supra note__, at 1239 (dubbing penalty defaults “information-forcing defaults”).  
17 See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opting Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L. J. 2032 (2012). 
18 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 763, 
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strongest such rules within these constraints can be outmaneuvered by firms with the means and 
motivation to do so. 
Unless robust competition over protecting consumer privacy develops in the marketplace—an 
unlikely  prospect—firms  will  generally  prefer  for  consumers  to  be  in  the  Track-Me  position. 
Because firms can influence people’s responses to tracking defaults, most Track-Me defaults are 
likely to be too sticky and many Do-Not-Track defaults are likely to be too slippery. Further, neither 
the consumers who stick with Track-Me defaults nor those who opt out of Do-Not-Track defaults 
will necessarily be making well-informed decisions. Therefore, personal data tracking defaults are 
unlikely to facilitate the satisfaction of heterogeneous consumer preferences or produce informed 
resolution of the conflict between people’s desire for information privacy and their desire for the 
benefits produced by their data. 
Other privacy scholars have been skeptical of the idea that a notice-and-choice regime could 
produce robust individual decision-making about personal data privacy.
19 Yet their critiques have not 
confronted and have even equivocated in the face of the assumptions about defaults made by the 
standard behavioral economics literature.
20 Some of them continue to advocate defaults, but on 
norms-setting grounds rather than as sticky policy defaults or information-forcing penalty defaults
21 
But for defaults to set these norms, the signal must be clear. Experiences with other default rules 
give reason to think that tracking default settings opposed by firms will be accompanied by a great 
deal of noise, noise calculated to confuse the signal and make the opposed default slippery. Only 
tracking defaults that firms embrace will be sticky. 
This Article fills the current intellectual gap with an understanding of the limits of defaults and 
surrounding altering and framing rules and, given these limits, how the dynamic responses of firms 
to defaults can undermine policymakers’ aims. More broadly, it casts doubt on the use of “nudges”
22 
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19 The classic article on personal information tracking defaults is Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (2001). See also, e.g., Paul M. 
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1609, 1660-63 & 1681-85 (1999) (critiquing the 
individual choice model of privacy); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARVARD L. 
REV. 1880 (2013) (same).   
20 See,  e.g.,  Schwartz,  supra  note  __  at  1686-87  (suggesting  that  a  default  of  minimal  data  disclosure  would  allow 
individuals to “personalize their privacy levels”); Paul M. Schwartz , Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2055, 2100 (2004) (“This Article prefers an opt-in default because . . . it would place pressure on the better-informed 
party to disclose material information about how personal data will be used. This default promises to force the disclosure 
of hidden information about data-processing practices.”); Solove, supra note __ at 1900 (“[P]rivacy self-management 
should not be abandoned”). 
21 See, e.g., Solove, supra note __ at 1903 (“The law should develop and codify basic privacy norms… in a form like the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), where certain default rules can be waived.”); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To 
Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 281 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH 281, 341 (2012) (suggesting that tracking defaults be used to signal and effectively set social norms about what 
information should and should not be shared, with whom, and under what conditions). 
22 See Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness 6 (Yale 2008). 
(defining a “nudge” as a policy tool that “alters people’s behavior in a predicable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives.”). WHY NOT PRIVACY BY DEFAULT?  11/4/13 12:50 PM 
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in policymaking to help people make better choices about information privacy.
23 Track-Me and Do-
Not-Track defaults might pave the political path to a better system for regulating personal data 
tracking, but also might defuse the political will to implement better regulation.  
This article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the theoretical and empirical foundation for 
the use of defaults in policymaking: the mechanisms that can make defaults sticky, the conditions 
under which these mechanisms are likely to operate, and the use of altering and framing rules to 
calibrate the stickiness of defaults. Part III explains how policymakers appear likely to translate the 
theories behind the use of defaults as policy tools to the personal data tracking arena, including the 
contours of the  defaults and  altering and framing rules policymakers are likely to select. Part IV 
looks to defaults in other fields to assess when defaults do and do not work in practice. Based on 
these experiences, Part V considers how tracking defaults are likely to play out, predicting that 
Track-Me defaults are likely to be overly sticky and Do-Not-Track defaults are likely to be overly 
slippery.  Part  V  also  explains  why  altering  rules,  framing  rules,  and  competition  have  limited 
potential to change these dynamics. Part VI concludes with an exploration of the potential political 
consequences of using defaults in information privacy policy.  
II.  DEFAULTS IN THEORY 
A default is a setting or position that has been preselected, but can be altered. Many websites, 
mobile phones, mobile applications and other devices and programs that can facilitate or inhibit 
tracking are pre-set to allow tracking today, such that “Track-Me” is a quasi-default.
24 These settings 
are not full-fledged defaults, in that opting out is not always possible—some devices and programs 
cannot be used without tracking enabled and some trackers track consumers even when program or 
device settings are in the Do-Not-Track position.
25 But consumers can opt out of some tracking to 
	 ﾠ
23 A burgeoning literature advocates the use of nudges to encourage people to make better privacy decisions. See, e.g., 
Rebecca Balebako et al., Nudging Users Towards Privacy on Mobile Devices, in Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop 
on Persuasion, Influence, Nudge & Coercion Through Mobile Devices (2011); M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in 
Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1027 (2012); Yang Wang et al., “It made me think twice”: A Field Trial of a 
Facebook Privacy Nudge, Paper in the Privacy Law Scholars Conference (2013); Alessandro Acquisti, Nudging Privacy: The 
Behavioral Economics of Personal Information, 7 IEEE 82 (2009). 
24 See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, How to Opt Out of Google’s Plan to Use Your Name and Comments in Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 
2013) (discussing how some of Google’s settings are set by default to Track-Me); Andrew Couts, Are Apple’s iOS 7 privacy 
settings  purposefully  misleading,  or  just  a  mess?,  Digital  Trends  (Sept.  29,  2013)  (discussing  iPhone  defaults  set  to  enable 
tracking), 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/apple-your-ios-7-privacy-settings-are-a-mess/#ixzz2iCafwri3.  Although  most 
tracking settings are set by default to Track-Me, a few are not. See, e.g., Safari Blocks all Cookies by Default, APPLE SUPPORT 
COMMUNITIES, https://discussions.apple.com/thread/4040376?start=0&tstart=0 (last visited Aug. 1, 2013).  
25 See, e.g., Peter Maass & Megha Rajagopalan, That’s No Phone. That’s My Tracker, PROPUBLICA, July 13, 2012 (reporting 
that cellphone tracking canot be turned off, even if phone is powered down); Google: Gmail users ‘have no legitimate 
expectation of privacy’, Rt.com (Aug. 13, 2013), http://on.rt.com/47y0ku (Gmail cannot be used without allowing 
Google to scan email content for various purposes); Balebako et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (finding 
that trackers continue to track users who have turned on Do-Not-Track browser settings); Katy Bachman, Yahoo Says No 
to Microsoft's 'Do Not Track' Browser, Others expected to follow suit, ADWEEK (Oct. 26, 2012) (reporting that Yahoo and others 
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some extent. Consumers can delete some types of cookies from their browsers or install software 
that  blocks  some  internet  and  cellphone  tracking.
26 They  can  change  tracking  options  on  their 
Facebook, Twitter, or Google accounts.
27 They can set their browsers or install cellphone apps to tell 
advertising networks not to serve them behaviorally targeted ads.
28  
The first premise behind the use of defaults in policymaking is that defaults are sticky, and 
today’s “Track-Me” quasi-default supports that premise. While a majority of consumers claim that 
they  have  taken  at  least  some  steps  to  opt  out  of  internet  tracking,29 these  claims  are  almost 
certainly  more  aspirational  than  representational. 30  It  seems  extremely  unlikely  that  many 
consumers successfully opt out  in a thoroughgoing way on each device, browser, and app through 
which  they  are  tracked.  Currently,  about  17%  of  U.S.  Firefox  users  have  “Do-Not-Track” 
activated.
31 But fewer than 10% of consumers even know that common mobile phone apps track 
them.
32 Although claims by firms that they have data on nearly all Americans and can track nearly all 
internet users may likewise be exaggerated, these claims are unlikely to be very far off the mark.
 33 
Most consumers stick with most Track-Me positions. 
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will not honor a Do-Not-Track signal received from an internet explorer browser).. Firefox is developing technology to 
prevent the placement of cookies on computers when the browser is set to Do-Not–Track, but browsers are unlikely to 
win a technology war with trackers, which in the past have evaded technological attempts to maintain privacy. See Chris 
Jay Hoofnagle, Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273 (2012).. 
26 See, e.g., Alan Henry, Everyone’s Trying to Track What You Do on the Web: Here’s How to Stop Them, LIFEHACKER (Feb. 22, 
2012),  http://lifehacker.com/5887140/everyones-trying-to-track-what-you-do-on-the-web-heres-how-to-stop-them; 
Erica Naone, Smartphone Apps: How to Spot and Stop Firms Tracking Your Phone, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 5, 
2011, at __. 
27 See, e.g., Alan Henry, Facebook Is Tracking Your Every Move on the Web; Here’s How to Stop It, LIFEHACKER (Sept. 26, 
2011),  http://lifehacker.com/5843969/facebook-is-tracking-your-every-move-on-the-web-heres-how-to-stop-it;  Ryan 
Tate,  How  Google  Spies  on  Your  Gmail  Account  (And  How  To  Stop  It),  GAWKER  (May  11,  2011), 
http://gawker.com/5800868/how-google-spies-on-your-gmail-account-and-how-to-stop-it; Alan Henry, Twitter Wants to 
Start Tracking you on the Web, Here’s How to Opt-Out, LIFEHACKER (July 3, 2013), http://lifehacker.com/twitter-wants-to-
start-tracking-you-on-the-web-heres-661569459. 
28 See ADCHOICES, http://www.youradchoices.com; Wendy Davis, New App Lets Mobile Users Opt Out Of Behavioral 
Targeting, ONLINE MEDIA DAILY (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/197792/new-app-
lets-mobile-users-opt-out-of-behavioral-ta.html#axzz2Z4TIj0jL. 
29 See Rainie et al., supra note __ at 8 (86% of consumers claim to have taken at least one step to avoid being tracked).  
30 Consumers claim to engage in significantly more privacy-protective online behavior than they truly do. Carlos Jensen 
et al., Privacy practices of Internet users: Self-reports versus observed behavior, 63 INT. J. HUMAN-COMPUTER STUD. 203 (2005). 
31 Alex Fowler, Mozilla’s New Do Not Track Dashboard: Firefox Users Continue to Seek Out and Enable DNT, MOZILLA 
PRIVACY  BLOG  (May  3,  2013),  https://blog.mozilla.org/privacy/2013/05/03/mozillas-new-do-not-track-dashboard-
firefox-users-continue-to-seek-out-and-enable-dnt/.  
32  David  Talbot,  Using  Crowdsourcing  to  Protect  Your  Privacy,  MIT  TECH.  REV.  (Apr.  2,  2012), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/427390/using-crowdsourcing-to-protect-your-privacy/page/2/. 
33  While consumers claim to engage in privacy-protective behavior, firms that collect personal data claim to have 
extensive data on most U.S. adults. See Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 
2012. One firm claims that it can use digital fingerprinting technology, a technology that does not depend on cookies 
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Why  is  today’s  Track-Me  quasi-default  so  sticky?  Using  today’s  Track-Me  position  as  an 
example, this Part explains the mechanisms that can make defaults sticky and the conditions that 
facilitate the operation of these mechanisms. It then elaborates on how academics have theorized 
that  defaults,  and  altering  and  framing  rules  to  fine-tune  those  defaults,  might  be  used  in 
policymaking  so  as  to  nudge  people  toward  particular  positions  and/or  educate  people  about 
particular choices. 
 
A.   MECHANISMS THAT MAKE DEFAULTS STICKY 
Three types of mechanisms can operate to make defaults sticky: (1) transaction barriers, (2) 
judgment  and  decision  biases,  and  (3)  the  preference-forming  effects  of  defaults.
34 Not  every 
mechanism will affect every default, but where a default is sticky, one or more of these mechanisms 
are at work.  
1.  Transaction Barriers 
The first type of mechanism that can make a default sticky is transaction barriers. Transaction 
barriers here include (a) costs, (b) confusion, and (c) the belief that opting out is futile. Opting out of 
tracking today is impeded by each of these barriers.  
a.  Where the real or perceived costs of opting out appear not worth the benefits, it is rational to 
stick with the default. To opt out of tracking today, consumers must find the opt-out procedure, if 
one exists, and execute the steps for opting out, such as installing a program, changing settings, or 
completing an online form. Even when not onerous, this process must be completed for each device 
(e.g.,  cellphone,  tablet,  desktop)  and  program  through  which  one  can  be  tracked.35 In  some 
instances,  consumers  must  separately  opt  out  of  tracking  by  each  tracker.  For  example,  some 
advertising  networks  permit  consumers  to  opt  out  of  receiving  behavioral  advertising,  but  the 
procedure requires consumers to individually select each advertising network from which they would 
like to opt out.
36 Further, some of these steps must be repeatedas firm privacy policies change, as 
trackers develop new ways to evade consumer attempts to opt out, and as consumers upgrade 
devices or software.37 In addition, if a consumer deletes all cookies, cookies that had been sending 
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and can identify mobile devices in addition to computers, to identify 98% of internet users. See Adam Tanner, The Web 
Cookie Is Dying. Here's The Creepier Technology That Comes Next, FORBES, June 17, 2013. 
34 For a more detailed explanation of some of the mechanisms that can make defaults sticky, see Lauren E. Willis, When 
Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, U. CHI. L. REV.. (forthcoming 2013). 
35 See, e.g., http://www.coxdigitalsolutions.com/privacy-policy/consumer-opt-out-program/ (“If you use more than one 
type of browser or more than one computer to access the Internet, you will have to opt out in each browser and on each 
computer that you use.”). 
36 See, e.g., Opt Out from Online Behavioral Advertising, ADCHOICES, http://www.aboutads.info/choices/#completed (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2013).  
37 See, e.g., http://www.coxdigitalsolutions.com/privacy-policy/consumer-opt-out-program/ (“You may need to opt out 
repeatedly. If you delete or otherwise alter your browser’s cookie file (including upgrading certain browsers) you may 
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do-not-track  messages  must  be  reinstalled38;  if  a  consumer  changes  browser  settings  to  allow 
tracking so as to facilitate a particular transaction, she must go back and change settings again to 
return to a do-not-track position.  
Should existing transaction costs not be a sufficient deterrent, firms can add other costs, such as 
conditioning cellphone app downloads or email use on permission to gather user data or scan user 
emails.
39 Short of conditioning access on tracking, firms can make refusing to be tracked costly. 
Many websites warn consumers: “If you turn cookies off, you will not have access to many features 
that make your user experience more efficient and some parts of our website will not function 
properly.”
40 .  
b. Three types of confusion can contribute to the stickiness of defaults. The first is confusion 
about the opt-out process, such that those who attempt to opt out fail to do so. The second is 
confusion about the value to which the default is set, and more particularly thinking that the default 
meets the consumer’s preferences when it does not. The third is confusion about the status of a 
default position, thinking that the position is a mandate and thus a position from which one cannot 
opt out.  
All of these types of confusion may contribute to the stickiness of today’s Track-Me quasi-
default. Many consumers think they know more about technology related to privacy than they do.
41 
Popular misconceptions include thinking that turning cellphones “off” disables phone tracking and 
that changing browser settings or deleting cookies disables internet tracking.
42 The result is that 
consumers  who attempt to opt out of tracking today often do not manage to do so to the extent 
they desire—and often mistakenly believe they have done.
43 For example, as facebook’s privacy 
settings became more granular, they also became more confusing, with the result that fewer users 




39 See Adrienne Porter Felt et al., Android Permissions: User Attention, Comprehension, and Behavior, Symposium on Usable Privacy 
and Security (SOUPS) 2012 (app downloads); Rt.com, supra note __ (Gmail). 
40 Consumer  Online  Privacy  Frequently  Asked  Questions,  U.S. BANK,  https://www.usbank.com/privacy/faq.html#4  (last 
visited  July  30,  2013).  See  also  Disney  Registration  Cookies  Policy, 
https://registration.disneyinternational.com/cookiepolicy.htm?p=130&fullScreen=true  (similar  warning  language); 
Information about Cookies on Monster, http://inside.monster.com/cookie-info/inside2.aspx (same). 
41 Jensen et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
42 See Alex Colon, Is Your Phone Tracking You Even with Location Services Turned Off?, PCMAG, Apr. 25, 2011 (turning off a 
phone does not stop tracking); Hoofnagle, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (changing browser settings or 
deleting cookies does not prevent tracking). 
43 Pedro G. Leon et al., Why Johnny Can’t Opt Out: A Usability Evaluation of Tools to Limit Online Behavioral Advertising 1, 4 
(Carnegie  Mellon  Univ.,  Working  Paper  ,  Oct.  31,  2011),  available  at 
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/ CMUCyLab11017.pdf (“[M]ultiple participants opted out of only 
one company . . . despite intending to opt out of all. Others mistook the [registration] page . . . as the opt out page.”). See 
also Janger & Schwartz, supra note Error!  Bookmark  not  defined., at 1241 (noting that confusing and misleading 
privacy notices are designed to lead to consumer inaction). 
44 Stutz et al. at 21-25, WHY NOT PRIVACY BY DEFAULT?  11/4/13 12:50 PM 
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Other consumers may not try to opt out, because although they would prefer not to be tracked, 
they believe that the default permits little tracking. Many people do not know that firms can track 
their  internet  use,  scan  their  email  text,  and  follow  their  device  movements  for  commercial 
purposes.
45 [I]n one survey nearly all respondents were surprised that a popular flashlight app sent 
the user’s unique cellphone ID and precise location to advertisers.
46 Most consumers falsely believe 
that the law significantly restricts collection of consumer information
47 and that the existence of a 
“Privacy Policy” means that their information is not shared with third parties.
48 Mistaken about what 
happens if they do nothing, even consumers who prefer not to be tracked have no reason to opt 
out.  
Others know about tracking, but are unaware of the (albeit limited) ways in which they can opt 
out.
49 Invisibility of the option to opt out inevitably leads to sticking with the default. 
c. Where opting out of a default appears to be futile, a consumer might choose not to even try. 
Some consumers today understand that opting out of the Track-Me position today is not entirely 
possible.
50 Others, perhaps accurately given the confusion just discussed, believe that they lack the 
expertise to manage to opt out entirely.51 For example, most users find Facebook privacy settings 
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45 See, e.g., Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It (Working Paper, Sept. 
29, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214 (finding that only 33% of users in 2009 survey knew that their internet 
use could be tracked across multiple websites without their consent); Adario Strange, Google's Snooping Gmail the Target of 
Microsoft's  Latest  'Scroogle'  Attack,  ITPROPORTAL  (Feb.  8,  2013),  http://www.itproportal.com/2013/02/08/googles-
snooping-gmail-the-target-of-microsoft-latest-scroogle-campaign/  (reporting  that  fewer  than  30%  of  Gmail  users 
surveyed knew that their email text was scanned for behavioral advertising purposes); Stephanie Clifford & Quentin 
Hardy, Attention, Shoppers: Store Is Tracking Your Cell, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013 (reporting that shoppers were surprised 
that their movements within a store were monitored through their cellphones). 
46 Talbot, supra note 32. 
47 See Turow et al., supra note 32, at 21, Tbl. 9 (2009). 
48 Ilana  Westerman,  What  Misconceptions  Do  Consumers  Have  about  Privacy?,  PRIVACY  PERSPECTIVES  (June  3,  2013), 
https://www.privacyassociation.org/privacy_perspectives/post/what_misconceptions_do_consumers_have_about_priv
acy; Jensen et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 223. 
49 Two-thirds of consumers are unaware of options they have to limit how much information is collected about them. 
See KRISTEN PURCELL ET AL., SEARCH ENGINE USE 2012 (PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 2012). See also 
Internet  Users’  Response  to  Consumer  Online  Privacy,  ANNALECT  (Mar.  14,  2012), 
http://annalect.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/Consumer_Online_Privacy_Whitepaper.pdf (finding 22% of users 
aware of some ability to opt out of tracking today). 
50 Rainie, supra note __ at 12. 
51 See, e.g., Blasé Ur et al., Smart, Useful, Scary, Creepy: Perceptions of Online Behavioral Advertising 8-9 (Carnegie Mellon Univ., 
Working Paper, July 13, 2012), available  at  http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab12007.pdf 
(reporting  that  in  response  to  questions  about  opting  out  of  behavioral  advertising,  many  consumers  expressed 
uncertainty about how to opt out); Yet Another OPT OUT You Should Think About, Oct. 20, 2013, available at 
http://www.boxlour.com/?p=319 (“Typically the process to opt out of something is not as easy as a “click here” 
button. In fact, they are literally banking on most of us getting so confused on the whole “opt out” process that we 
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difficult to use.52 Rather than engage in futile attempts to opt out of the default, these consumers 
might not even try.53   
2.  Judgment and Decision Biases  
The second type of mechanisms that can make defaults sticky is judgment and decision biases. 
Some biases are frequently associated with defaults, including (a) salience effects, (b) omission bias, 
(c) loss aversion and the endowment effect, and (d) procrastination and decision avoidance. But a 
closer look at the operation of tracking defaults reveals that nearly any type of bias might be invoked 
to favor a default, provided the conditions exist that facilitate the operation of biases, discussed 
further below. In the case of tracking, for example,  (e) excessive discounting, (f) choice bracketing, 
(g) the illusion of control, and (h) the sunk costs fallacy all may contribute to the stickiness of 
today’s Track-Me quasi-default.  
a.  Salience  effects,  meaning  the  tendency  for  salient  information  to  disproportionately  affect 
judgments and non-salient information to be ignored,
54 can result in sticking with a default even 
when the default and opt-out are not entirely invisible, but are simply not brought to mind.  
The salience of tracking strongly influences people’s privacy-related actions. One experiment 
found that consumers who are reminded of the privacy implications of disclosure disclose little, but 
those who are not reminded appear to forget about privacy—many will reveal socially stigmatized 
and even illegal behavior.
55 In the real world, tracking is rarely salient, in part because tracking occurs 
while a consumer is focused on something else–using a mobile phone, the internet, or the like. In 
addition, tracking may not be salient due to “warning fatigue”. For example, some smartphone users 
who  do  know  that  apps  collect  personal  information  have  become  so  habituated  to  fine  print 
disclosures that they have stopped reading the app permissions lists.
56 
b. Omission bias, favoring inaction over action, is related to salience effects in that actions are 
more salient than omissions. People are more likely to blame themselves about a poor outcome 
when they make an active decision to opt out of a default than when the outcome is caused by 
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52  See  Mary  Madden,  Privacy  Management  on  Social  Media  Sites,  PEW  2–3  (2012), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Privacy-management-on-social-media.aspx. 
53 See, e.g., Blasé Ur et al., Smart, Useful, Scary, Creepy: Perceptions of Online Behavioral Advertising 7 (Carnegie Mellon Univ., 
Working Paper, July 13, 2012), available  at  http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab12007.pdf 
(quoting consumer: “It makes me want to go home and delete all my cookies, but then I know that’s not gonna help 
much.”); Maria Karyda & Spyros Kokolakis, Privacy Perceptions among Members of Online Communities in DIGITAL PRIVACY 
253, 263 (Acquisti et al, eds. 2010) (discussing consumer sentiments that user attempts to obtain privacy on the internet 
are futile). 
54 See, e.g., T. Hossain & J. Morgan, Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay, 62 
ADVANCES IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 20 (2006). 
55 Leslie John et al., Strangers on a Plane, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 858 (2011). 
56 See Felt et al., supra note 39. WHY NOT PRIVACY BY DEFAULT?  11/4/13 12:50 PM 
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having  remained  in  the  default.
57 If  both  action  and  inaction  involve  some  risk  of  negative 
consequences, people may stick with the default to avoid future regret.  
Opting out of tracking today often involves clear negative consequences such as loss of website 
functionality  or  access  to  social  media.  Sticking  with  tracking  involves  a  risk  of  unknowable 
probability of potential future harms such as identity theft, price discrimination, and restricted sace 
for personal development.  Thus, unless a consumer believes that the costs of being tracked greatly 
exceed the benefits, she might not act to opt out, because opting out could lead to some losses and 
self-blame for those consequences, whereas staying put could lead to other losses but avoids self-
blame.
58  
c. Loss aversion means weighing losses more heavily than gains against some reference point.
59 The 
endowment  effect,  placing  a  higher  value  on  what  one  already  possesses  (or  perceives  oneself  as 
possessing) than on the same thing when one does not possess it, is a manifestation of this.
60 When 
the default forms the reference point, these biases favor the default.  
Research demonstrates an almost absurdly strong endowment effect for privacy. On average, 
people are willing to pay much more to keep data they are told is private that way, compared to what 
they will pay to obtain privacy when told that the default is for that data to be public; subjects in one 
experiment “were five times more likely to reject cash offers for their data if they believed that their 
privacy would be, by default, protected, than if they didn’t enjoy such belief.”
61 Thus, to the extent 
that consumers know they are currently in a Track-Me position, these biases favor that position. 
d.  Procrastination  and  decision  avoidance  are  biases  triggered  when  decisions  or  actions  appear 
difficult. These biases can cause people to procrastinate indefinitely or to affirmatively decide not to 
make any decision, either of which could lead to sticking with the default.
62  
Procrastination and decision avoidance likely contribute to the stickiness of tracking defaults 
today for several reasons. First, the opt-out decision is difficult. Each time they make a decision 
about  whether  to  opt  out  of  a  particular  form  of  tracking,  consumers  must  trade  off 
incommensurate costs and benefits (e.g., the more tangible costs of forgoing access to internet 
	 ﾠ
57 See,  e.g., Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference  Points  and  Omission  Bias, 59 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 475, 478 (1994). 
58 Cf. David A. Asch et al., Omission Bias and Pertussis Vaccination, 14 MED. DECISION MAKING 118, 120–21 (1994).  
59 See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 
19, 31 (1988). 
60 Russell Korobkin, Wrestling with the Endowment Effect, or How to Do Law and Economics Without the Coase Theorem (UCLA 
Sch.  of  Law,  Law-Econ  Research  Paper,  Paper  No.  13-10,  2013),  available  at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2289574.  
61 See  Alessandro  Acquisti  et  al.,  What  Is  Privacy  Worth  3,  in  21ST  WORKSHOP  ON  INFORMATION  SYSTEMS  AND 
ECONOMICS (2009), available at http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/privacy-worth-acquisti-
FPF.pdf .”).  
62 See, e.g., Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON. 121, passim (2001);Christopher 
J. Anderson, The Psychology of Doing Nothing: Forms of Decision Avoidance Result From Reason and Emotion, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
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content  or  customization  against  the  intangible  benefits  of  increased  space  for  personal 
experimentation and growth).
63 Second, opting out is costly;, as noted above, it requires consumers 
to navigate an opt-out process for each device or program that may be tracking them, steps that 
must be periodically revisited. Third, as explained above, opting out today is not entirely possible; 
some  tracking  is  practically  unavoidable,  and  some  consumers  know  it.  Rather  than  making  a 
difficult decision over and over again, or starting an endless and futile battle against trackers, some 
consumers might procrastinate taking action or even affirmatively decide not to make any decision, 
the effect of which is to stay in the default position.64  
e. Excessive discounting refers to people’s tendency to prefer a much smaller gain now to a larger 
gain later and to prefer a sure gain to an uncertain but probabilistically much larger gain.
65 When 
opting out of a default entails definite upfront costs and uncertain future benefits, discounting over 
time and certainty will incline people to remain with the default.  
The time and effort required to opt out of tracking today is immediate and certain. The benefits 
are in the future and uncertain, particularly given that future uses of information are unknown.
66 
Thus, discounting may bolster today’s Track-Me position. 
 f. Choice bracketing refers to whether a decision is evaluated in isolation or as part of a larger set of 
decisions.
67 Health-related decisions present an intuitive example. If the choice to eat a dessert or go 
for a run is made in isolation, the benefits of the dessert and costs of the run might easily outweigh 
the trivial incremental effect of each on health. Yet, the cumulative effect of these daily decisions can 
be enormous. Someone who views each choice in isolation might make less healthy choices than 
someone who mentally brackets decisions about diet, exercise, or health broadly.
68 Similarly, tracking 
decisions  can  be  conceived  narrowly  or  broadly.  One  consumer  might  make  each  decision  in 
isolation, considering whether to permit a particular entity to track her at a particular moment in 
time. Another consumer might conceptualize each tracking decision as part of a broader choice 
about whether to allow herself to be tracked by any entity anytime. Firms are able to connect data 
gathered  from  a  variety  of  sources–off-line,  on-line,  and  from  mobile  devices–about  a  single 
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63 See, e.g., Acquisti et al., What Is Privacy Worth, supra note 61, at 5–6 (discussing incommensurate tradeoffs consumers 
must make in the course of privacy-related decisions).  
64 Cf. Chad Proell & Stephen Sauer, “Stock” Options: The Debilitating Effects of Autonomy and Choice on Self-perceptions of Power , 
23 J. OF BUSINESS & BEHAV. SCIENCES (2011) (feelings of powerless lead to inaction). 
65 See, e.g., Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Construal-Level Theory of Psychological Distance, 117 PSYCHOL. REV. 440, passim 
(2010)  (explaining  the  tendency  for  people  to  discount  over  psychological  distance,  including  over  time  and  over 
uncertainty). 
66 See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Uncertainty, Ambiguity and Privacy, COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGY, 
Special Issue on Privacy, 6 (2012) (“[A]n individual who is facing privacy sensitive scenarios may be uncertain about the 
values of possible outcomes and their probability of occurrence, and . . . sometimes she may not even be able to form 
any beliefs about those values and those probabilities.”); NEFH, supra note __ at 126-29 (explaining that consumers 
cannot know how their information will be used or how those uses will affect them in the future). 
67 Daniel Read et al., Choice Bracketing, 19 J. OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171 (2000).  
68 Cf. id. at 171 (using example of decisions about smoking cigarettes). WHY NOT PRIVACY BY DEFAULT?  11/4/13 12:50 PM 
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consumer, collected over time.
69 Thus, the benefits of privacy and costs of a lack of privacy  depend 
on the whole of privacy, not its parts, leaving uncertain whether tracking by any particular party or 
of any particular type of information will tip the scales.
70 Because the marginal negative impact of 
tracking by any one tracker is negligible, bracketing the choice narrowly could lead to a decision to 
allow tracking. Broad choice bracketing is more likely to result in selecting a Do-Not-Track position 
because the entirety of potential harms from tracking looms larger.  
People often accept the bracketing implicit in a decision’s presentation,
71 and many tracking 
decisions today are presented in a narrow form—e.g., Would you like to opt out of “tailor[ed] ads” 
from Twitter?
72 Rather than presenting the user with a single broad opt-out choice, a single device or 
program  typically  requires  opting  out  of  a  series  of  particular  types  of  tracking.
73 Even  where 
broader choices are presented, such as in browser settings, trackers can ask consumers to alter that 
setting  as  to  a  particular  website,  a  narrow  choice.  Thus,  narrow  choice  bracketing  may  fortify 
today’s Track-Me position. 
g. The illusion of control is a bias that can lead people to take on more risk than they otherwise 
would,
74 and  therefore  might  encourage  consumers  to  stick  with  a  risky  default,  if  surrounding 
circumstances invoke the illusion. An example of the illusion is the common belief that one is less 
likely to experience an accident when one is driving than when one is a passenger, regardless of 
driving skill.
75  
Perceptions of control strongly affect privacy decision-making. Consumers who feel more in 
control of the exchange of their information with firms are more willing to allow those firms to 
collect more of their personal information.
76Giving consumers the illusion of more control leads 
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69 See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, What You Didn’t Post, Facebook May Still Know, NY TIMES, March 25, 2013 (describing 
aggregation of on-line and off-line data about individual consumers); Claire Cain Miller & Somini Sengupta, supra note 
__ (describing aggregation of on-line and mobile data about individual consumers).  
70 Cf. Solove, supra note __ at 1889-90 (dubbing this the “aggregation effect”). 
71 Id. at 188 (When “choices come to [people] one at a time, they will bracket them narrowly, and if choices come to 
them collectively, they will bracket more broadly.”).  
72 See Henry, supra note 27. 
73 See,  e.g.,  Jason  D.  O’Grady,  Four  privacy  settings  you  should  enable  in  iOS  7  immediately,  ZDNET  (Sept.  19,  2013), 
http://www.zdnet.com/four-privacy-settings-you-should-enable-in-ios-7-immediately-7000020902/. 
74 See, e.g., M. S. Horswill & Frank P. McKenna, The Effect of Perceived Control on Risk Taking, 29 J. OF APPLIED SOCIAL 
PSYCHOL. 377 (1999); Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 311 (1975).  
75 Frank P. McKenna, It Won't Happen to Me: Unrealistic Optimism or Illusion of Control?, 84 BRITISH J. OF PSYCHOL. 39, 39–
50 (1993). 
76 Nadia Olivero & Peter Lunt, Privacy Versus Willingness To Disclose In E-Commerce Exchanges: The Effect Of Risk Awareness 
On The Relative Role Of Trust And Control, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 243, 259 (2004). See also F. Stutzman et al., Silent Listeners: 
The Evolution of Privacy and Disclosure on Facebook, 4 J. PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY 2, 29 (2013) (finding that as Facebook 
gave users more control over settings that determine which other Facebook users can view their pages, users made more 
content “private” vis-a-vis other users, but also posted more confidential information, such that Facebook and parties to 
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them to both reveal more sensitive information and to allow more publication of that information.
77 
Firms today emphasize the degree to which consumers have control over tracking to encourage 
consumers to share more information. Google, for example, suggests that consumers connect their 
accounts  (enabling  tracking  across  accounts)  because  “Connecting  your  accounts  puts  you  in 
control” and then reminds consumers, “Remember, Google won’t share your searches or other 
private information with third-party services without your consent.”
78 Google itself uses information 
it gathers about consumers without explicit consent, but the “you are in control” pitch deflects 
attention from this.
79 Thus, giving consumers the apparent ability to opt out of tracking today may, 
by giving consumers the illusion of control, make them less likely to attempt to opt out.
80 
h. The sunk costs fallacy refers to a common error—people usually weigh costs they have already 
incurred and that cannot be reversed in their decision about whether to move forward with a project 
or switch course.
81 For example, someone who has spent time and effort determining how to use a 
particular type of software might continue using that software instead of switching to an easier-to-
use program because otherwise the effort on the first software seems to have been wasted. But 
because that time and effort can never be recovered, it should not come into the calculus about what 
software to use going forwards. Where the option to opt out of a default is not presented until after 
people have taken some investment in reliance on the default, the sunk costs fallacy will favor the 
default.  
For example, this fallacy may favor the Track-Me position for mobile apps. Consumers must 
select an app and go through part of the download process before they can learn how much data the 
app will gather from them if they complete the installation process.
82 At that point, the fallacy may 
encourage consumers to complete the download process regardless of what data is collected.  
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PERSONALITY SCIENCE 3 (2012).  
78 GOOGLE PROFILE PAGE, https://profiles.google.com/u/0/connectedaccounts?partnerid=gplp0 (last visited __). 
79 See Tate, supra note __ (reporting on “obscure checkbox on a buried Google account preferences pane, which reads, 
‘use my Google contact information to suggest accounts from other sites.’” and explaining “[b]y default, this box is 
checked, which means Google has been scanning your Gmail contacts, unless by some miracle you found this option, 
buried several clicks beyond your Gmail inbox, and disabled it.”). 
80 Consumers who take more steps to avoid online tracking today also reveal more about themselves online. Rainie, 
supra note __ at 18. Although the direction of causation is unknowable, it is possible that the illusion of control 
contributes to increased disclosure.   
81 Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 
(1985). 
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3.  Preference-Formation Effects  
The third type of mechanism through which defaults garner adherents is that involved in the 
formation of preferences.
83 This happens in two ways, through (a) the recommendation effect and 
(b) the experience effect. 
a. The recommendation effect is the common interpretation of a default as a form of implicit advice 
by a more knowledgeable party as to what most people prefer or ought to prefer. Where consumers 
lack pre-existing preferences, they will often follow this implicit advice.
84  
Research demonstrates that consumers follow the crowd, changing their privacy behaviors to 
match the perceived behaviors of others.
85 When consumers believe tracking defaults are selected 
based  on  majoritarian  preferences,  they  may  accept  them  on  the  basis  that  they  reflect  social 
norms.
86 Alternatively, consumers may select the default because they trust the firms with which they 
do  business  (e.g.,  frequented  websites,  wireless  providers)  and  assume  these  firms  have  set  the 
default with the consumers’ best interests in mind.
87 
b. Where people do not have a pre-existing preference, the experience  effect  may lead them to 
develop a preference for and stick with the default position after spending some time experiencing 
it. For example, cellphone users who perceive themselves as benefitting from their existing privacy 
settings might choose to stick with a phone’s Track-Me position. Yet, if Do-Not-Track had been the 
phone’s default setting, they would have become accustomed to that position and developed a 
preference for it instead.
88 
B.  CONSUMER HETEROGENEITY AND THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE MECHANISMS 
THAT MAKE DEFAULTS STICKY OPERATE  
Not all of the mechanisms that can make defaults sticky operate on all consumers all the time. 
One  source  of  heterogeneity  is  differences  in  consumer  susceptibility  to  biases.  For  example, 
consumers approach choices with different discount functions, not all consumers are affected by 
omission bias, and while most of us are procrastinators, consumers do not all procrastinate on the 
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83 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002), (discussing preference-formation 
effects of defaults). 
84 See, e.g., Craig R. M. McKenzie et al., Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 414, 414 (2006).  
85 Alessandro Acquisti et al., The Impact of Relative Judgments on Concern about Privacy, 49 J. MKTG. RES. 3 (2012), 
86 See, e.g., Tene & Polonetsy, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 341; Janger & Schwartz, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 1250 (explaining that information privacy norms are shaped by existing information privacy 
practices). 
87 Although cellphone companies do not fare as well, Amazon, Google, and Apple are among the ten companies with 
the highest reputations among consumers, and trust is one of the major drivers of these ratings. Harris Poll 2013 
Reputation  Quotient  Survey  Summary  Report  6  &  9,  HARRIS  POLL  (Feb.  2013), 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/2013%20RQ%20Summary%20Report%20FINAL.pdf. 
88 Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010 (2013) (suggesting that 
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same  things  or  to  the  same  extent.
89 Consumer  responses  to  transaction  barriers  are  also 
heterogeneous,  independent  of  consumer  valuations  of  the  default  and  opt-out  positions;  for 
example, some consumers might find an opt-out process confusing that others have no trouble 
completing.  Much of this heterogeneity does not correspond well to who ought to opt out and who 
ought to stick with the default. Whether someone suffers from the illusion of control or is more 
realistic in her appraisal, for example, might affect whether she opts out of a risky default position, 
but may not be a good barometer of whether she ought to take on the risky or less risky position.   
Two sources of heterogeneity, however, are theoretically well-aligned with the use of defaults 
that aim to be sticky: consumers’ understanding of their options and consumers’ understanding of 
their own preferences. When consumers understand their options and their preferences well, they 
can usually match the two easily, absent transaction barriers. A consumer who knows she prefers the 
opt-out position will not be swayed by the implicit advice conveyed in the policymaker’s selection of 
the default, for example.
90 Likewise, consumers who already know their options are unlikely to be 
affected by how salient each option is at the moment of decision. In these situations, biases and the 
preference-formation effects of defaults have little influence on outcomes. That is, defaults will not 
be sticky.
91 
But when consumers do not understand their options, their preferences, or both, the framing of 
the decision can strongly influence the consumer’s choice. When options are numerous, complex, 
indistinct, shifting, or have uncertain attributes, consumers are routinely unable to evaluate and 
compare all options. Consumers might find their own preferences opaque when they hold those 
preferences weakly, have had insufficient experience to form preferences, and/or have competing 
preferences involving incommensurate tradeoffs. Under these conditions, the option framed as the 
default will often be sticky.
92 This is not the direct result of the option being presented as the default. 
It is because many of the mechanisms that make defaults sticky are more likely to operate when 
consumers find the decision environment or their own preferences opaque.
93 
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94 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 74, 74 (2004) (finding that not everyone is affected by the 
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90 Cf. Erin Todd Bronchetti et al., When A Nudge Isn’t Enough: Defaults And Saving Among Low-Income Tax Filers, NBER 
Working Paper 16887 (2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16887 (finding that placing part of tax refund in a savings 
vehicle by default had no effect on whether taxpayer saved the funds, and suggesting that the result was because 
taxpayers had well-understood pre-existing preferences about whether to save or spend the funds). 
91 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 60, at 1622 (presenting evidence that when preference uncertainty is removed, defaults 
lose their power). 
92 See, e.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 59, at 29 (finding that choice difficulty increases the pull of defaults); id. 
at 8 (finding subjects more likely to choose to remain with the status quo when their preferences are weaker).  
93 Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference: An Overview, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE 1 
(Sarah  Lichtenstein  &  Paul  Slovic  eds.,  2006)  (observing  that  judgment  and  decision  biases  are  strongest  when 
preferences are uncertain). Other academics have described this process a bit differently, claiming that when consumers 
lack pre-existing preferences, they construct preferences in the course of decisionmaking, and that the framing of the 
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Most consumers understand their information privacy options poorly.
94 The variety of data that 
can be collected through tracking, the host of entities that can collect or obtain that data, the ways 
that data can be used, and the potential costs and benefits of data collection are bewildering. The 
intangible  effects  of  tracking  are  nigh  impossible  to  assess;  for  example,  most  people  probably 
cannot forecast whether any particular tracking will make them feel watched or how such a feeling 
will impact their lives.
95 Even as to concrete effects, people do not know—and cannot know--what 
effect their data will have on prices they pay, access to employment, chances of identity theft, and so 
on.
96 This complexity defies simplification. As one set of researchers who found that simplifying the 
language  and  formatting  of  privacy  policies  barely  improved  consumer  comprehension  put  it: 
“[E]ven the most readable policies are too difficult for most people to understand and even the best 
policies are confusing.”
97  
Most  consumers  have  a  similarly  poor  grasp of  their  own  privacy  preferences  and  of  what 
actions are necessary to meet those preferencesIn part this may be because technology is evolving so 
rapidly that they have not thought about who has access to their data and how it might be used.
98 
Even consumers who describe themselves as placing a very high value on privacy act in ways that 
reveal abundant private information; most consumers who say they want to keep information about 
themselves  private  will  reveal  that  very  information  when  asked  for  it,  even  when  asked  by  a 
computer  “bot”  (interactive  figure)  on  a  commercial  website.
99 Consumers  also  have  competing 
preferences  and  cannot  make  the  tradeoffs  between  the  incommensurate  costs  and  benefits  of 
privacy;  they  want  to  keep  their  personal  information  private  and  they  want  the  benefits  made 
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into play. See Julie R. Agnew et al., Who Chooses Annuities? An Experimental Investigation of the Role of Gender, Framing and 
Defaults,  98 AM. ECON. REV. 418, 421 (2008) (finding experimentally that defaults have no effect when transaction 
barriers, biases, and preference formation effects are absent). Further, many of these mechanisms can lead a consumer to 
remain in a default position without affecting her preferences; a consumer who sticks with a default due to transaction 
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94 Cf. Jensen et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (finding that consumers have little understanding of even 
well-publicized privacy-related technologies, such as cookies). 
95 See, e.g., Ur et al.,supra note __ ; Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, An Empirical Study of How People Perceive 
Online  Behavioral  Advertising,  (Carnegie  Mellon  Univ.,  Working  Paper,  Nov.  10,  2009),  available  at 
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab09015.pdf.  
96 See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 66.  
97 Aleecia M. McDonald et al., A  Comparative  Study  of  Online  Privacy  Policies  and  Formats,  5672 LECTURE NOTES IN 
COMPUTER SCI. 37, 52 (2009). 
98 Cf. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Privacy and Modern Advertising: Most US Internet Users Want “Do Not Track” to Stop 
Collection  of  Data  About  their  Online  Activities  10  (Oct.  8,  2012),  http://goodtimesweb.org/documentation/SSRN-
id2152135.pdf (finding that 87% of consumers had never heard that policymakers are considering a “Do Not Track” 
option for the internet).  
99 See Sarah Spiekermann et al., E-Privacy in 2nd Generation E-Commerce: Privacy Preferences Versus Actual Behavior § 3.3 
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possible by revealing that information.
100 One survey’s findings are telling: 84% of consumers say 
they would rather receive targeted advertising in exchange for online content than to pay for online 
content with money, but 93% of these same consumers say that they would opt into a Do-Not-
Track position if given the choice.
101  
Thus, the personal data tracking area seems to be one in which consumer uncertainty about 
options and their own preferences would facilitate the operation of mechanisms that make defaults 
sticky.
102  
C.   THE THEORY BEHIND THE USE OF DEFAULTS IN POLICYMAKING 
Observing that people tend to stick with many default settings, academics have suggested that 
defaults can be used in policymaking in two ways: to increase the number of people in the default 
position (policy defaults) or to provide private parties with incentives to educate people about the 
default  (penalty  defaults).  To  ensure  that  policy  defaults  are  sticky  for  consumers  with  weak 
preferences but not for those who prefer the opt-out position, and to ensure that penalty defaults 
are information-forcing, policymakers have sought to employ a variety of altering rules (rules about 
the process for opting out) and framing rules (rules about the presentation of the default). The 
following explains the theory behind (a) policy defaults, (b) penalty defaults, and (c) altering and 
framing rules. 
a. Policy defaults are put in place with the explicit goal of increasing the number of people in the 
default position.
103 The idea is to set the default to a position that is good for most individuals 
and/or for society,
104 under the assumptions that (1) the majority will stick with the default and (2) 
the minority who have contrary preferences, and only this minority, will opt out. The use of policy 
defaults theoretically aligns well with the fact that the mechanisms that make defaults sticky are more 
likely to operate where consumers are uncertain about their preferences and options. The default 
will in theory guide uncertain individuals to the position that is most likely to be the best for them, 
but will not prevent those who know they have contrary preferences from opting out.  
The iconic case of a policy default is automatic enrollment in defined contribution retirement 
savings  plans,  which  is  believed  to  be  the  best  position  for  the  vast  majority  of  employees. 
Employers that have made participation in their plans the default have increased their employee 
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participation rates by forty percentage points or more.
105 Another example is the default for checking 
account overdraft coverage, which effectively requires banks to default consumers out of expensive 
overdraft coverage for ATM and nonrecurring debit card transactions unless the consumer opts 
out.
106 Regulators enacted this default in part on the theory that the default position was the best 
position for most consumers, and the few consumers who benefitted from overdraft coverage on 
these transactions could opt out.
107 
b. Penalty defaults are used to correct information asymmetries between parties, such as commonly 
exists  between  firms  and  consumers.  The  default  is  set  to  a  position  disliked  by  firms,  on  the 
premises that firms that want consumers to opt out will be forced to (1) reveal the default and (2) 
engage  in  a  process  of  negotiation.
108 Like  policy  defaults,  penalty  defaults  align  well  with  the 
evidence that uncertain consumers are more likely to be affected by the default. Firm efforts to 
explain the default and opt-out positions so as to convince consumers to opt out will, in theory, 
educate precisely those consumers who need to know more about the default to make a good 
decision. 
Two well-known penalty defaults are the warranties of merchantability109 and of fitness for a 
particular  purpose110 under  the  Uniform  Commercial  Code.  The  penalty  default  is  that  the 
warranties will apply; a seller that does not want the warranties to be part of the contract for sale 
must explicitly opt out.111 The checking account overdraft coverage default can also be seen as 
penalty default, on the theory that if the bank wants consumers to opt out, it will be forced to 
explain how overdraft coverage works and convince consumers to opt out of the default and into 
overdraft coverage.  
c. Policymakers attempt to manage the stickiness, slipperiness, and informativeness of defaults 
through altering  rules  and  framing  rules. Altering rules tinker with the process for opting out. For 
example, a software default setting can be designed to allow a user to opt out with a single click, or 
can require a user to go through many steps. Framing rules manage the way the default and opt-out 
option  are  presented  to  the  user,  whether  by  architecture  or  by  messaging.  Architecturally,  for 
example, a software default setting could be made more or less salient through the positioning of 
opt-out controls, hidden deep inside multiple menus or popping up in a nagging window on the 
screen.  Opting  out  of  a  default  also  might  be  made  more  or  less  attractive  through  messages 
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conveyed to the user. For example, an alert or notice box might suggest that the user ought to 
change  a  software  setting,  or  instead  warn  the  user  that  changing  the  setting  could  result  in 
problems. 
Where a default might otherwise be too sticky, altering rules might aim to keep the costs of 
opting out low and the process for opting out simple and framing rules might aim to keep the 
option to opt out visible. But where policymakers fear a default will be too slippery and will not be 
information-forcing, they might set altering rules that place some transaction costs in the way of 
opting out and framing rules that require the provision of information as a precondition of opting 
out. Altering and framing rules reflect some awareness that defaults alone will not achieve their 
desired ends. A default otherwise might be stickier than the policymaker intends, such that the 
minority who ought to opt out do not. Or a default might otherwise be slipperier than a policymaker 
intends, such that the better-informed party is able to change the default without educating and 
negotiating with the less-informed party. The theory is that carefully calibrated altering and framing 
rules will make policy and penalty defaults work properly.
112  
Two  examples  show  how  surrounding  rules  are  employed  in  an  attempt  to  calibrate  the 
stickiness of defaults. In the case of  automatic enrollment in retirement savings plans, policymakers 
are concerned that the default could be too sticky. Altering and framing rules therefore require 
employers to give employees who are enrolled by default  written notices of the right to opt out at 
specified intervals, notices that must be written at a level that can be understood by the average 
employee,  so  that  the  opportunity  to  opt  out  is  not  confusing  or  invisible.
113 In  contrast, 
policymakers are concerned that the default for checking account overdraft coverage on ATM and 
debit transactions could be too slippery and might not be information-forcing.
114 Therefore, framing 
rules require banks to give accountholders notices explaining the cost of opting out of the default 
and into overdraft coverage—notices that must be segregated out from other account documents.
115 
Altering  rules  require  banks  to  provide  the  same  account  terms,  conditions,  and  features  to 
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accountholders  who  do  and  do  not  stick  with  the  default,
116and  prohibit  banks  from  opting 
consumers out in routinely unread fine print; consumers must affirmatively take action to opt out.
117  
 
III.   TRANSLATING DEFAULT THEORY TO TRACKING POLICY 
The rationales for using defaults, the mechanisms that make them sticky, and the background 
conditions that facilitate the operation of those mechanisms appear to favor the use of defaults in 
privacy  policymaking.  Not  the  illegitimate  Track-Me  quasi-default  that  currently  exists;  if 
policymakers want consumers to make their own decisions about tracking, consumers ought to be 
permitted to choose the Do-Not-Track position. But given that many consumers are uncertain 
about their choices and preferences, policy defaults might help lead these consumers to the best 
outcome while allowing consumers with contrary preferences to opt out, and penalty defaults might 
force firms to educate consumers to help consumers make better decisions. The following describes 
the personal data tracking default positions, the scope of those positions, and the accompanying 
altering and framing rules that the theory behind the use of defaults in policymaking would support.   
A.    SETTING: TRACK-ME OR DO-NOT-TRACK 
How any particular tracking default ought to be set and how it is expected to function in theory 
depends  on  the  policymaker’s  prior  beliefs  about  which  position  is  best  for  most  people.  If 
policymakers  believe  tracking  produces  more  potential  benefits  to  individuals  and  society  (for 
example, in the form of financial support for internet content or application development) than 
potential  privacy  harms,  they  might  support  a  Track-Me  default.  Because  in  this  scenario 
policymakers believe that the majority ought to be in the Track-Me position,
118 it would be a policy 
default. For example, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the main international standards-
setting body for the internet,
119 has drafted a proposal that would, in effect, set Track-Me as the 
default for some tracking of some information about individuals’ use of the internet and mobile 
devices.
120 The  Federal  Trade  Commission  (FTC)  has  suggested  that  a  similar  Track-Me  default 
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should be voluntarily adopted by firms or mandated by Congress for all firms that collect or use 
consumer data that can reasonably be linked to particular consumers, computers, or devices.
121  
On the other hand, if policymakers believe that tracking produces more potential privacy harms 
(for  example,  in  the  form  of  increased  risk  of  identity  theft  or  decreased  space  for  individual 
experimentation and growth) than benefits to individuals and society, they might support a Do-Not-
Track  default.  Because  they  believe  that  the  untracked  position  is  best  for  most  people  or  for 
society, these policymakers would be again looking for a policy default effect, meaning that the 
majority would stick with this default position but those with strong contrary preferences would opt 
out. Many supporters of Do-Not-Track defaults appear to aim for a policy default effect.
122  
If policymakers are uncertain about the social welfare effects of tracking or believe that people 
have heterogeneous preferences about tracking, they also might support a Do-Not-Track default. 
Personal information tracking presents a case of information asymmetry, where one party (the firm) 
is  well  informed  and  the  other  (the  consumer)  is  poorly  informed.  Because  many  internet  and 
mobile application firm business models depend on the revenue that can be obtained through the 
sale of tracked information (largely for behavioral advertising purposes), firms have a strong interest 
in placing consumers in a Track-Me position.
123 Thus, a policymaker might intend for the Do-Not-
Track default to operate as a penalty default, with the expectation that firms will reveal this default 
position to consumers in the process of urging consumers to opt out, and that consumers will then 
be free to make informed decisions about whether they want to be tracked. Academics in particular 
have argued for various forms of Do-Not-Track defaults on this basis.
124  
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121 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE vii & 35-59 (2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter, FTC Privacy Report].  See also FED. TRADE 
COMM’N,  MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES 21(Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf  [hereinafter, FTC Mobile Privacy Report]. 
122 See, e.g., Chris Soghoian, End The Charade: Regulators Must Protect Users’ Privacy By Default, OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY 
COMMISSIONER  OF  CANADA  (Dec.  2010),  http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-
recherche/2010/soghoian_201012_e.asp  (implying  that  a  Do-Not-Track  default  would  be  so  sticky  that  advertisers 
would be forced to abandon behavioral advertising); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. 
(suggesting that supporters of Do-Not-Track defaults aim to keep people in the Do-Not-Track position rather than to 
give people a choice). 
123 See,  e.g., Vindu Goel, Facebook  Eases  Privacy  Rules  for  Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2013 (“But fundamentally, 
Facebook  wants  to  encourage  more  public  sharing,  not  less.  The  company,  which  has  about  its  1.2  billion  users 
worldwide, is locked in a battle with Twitter and Google to attract consumer advertisers like food, phone and clothing 
companies.”); James Temple, Rules Against Tracking Don’t Go Far Enough, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Mar. 7, 2012, 
available  at  http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Rules-against-online-tracking-don-t-go-far-enough-3387373.php 
(“Targeting  ads  based  on  search  queries,  sites  visited,  stories  read  and  social  connections  forms  the  core  of  the 
multimillion-dollar business models of many online companies, including Google, Yahoo and Facebook.”). 
124 See, e.g., Kesan & Shah, supra note 13, at 621 (arguing that setting browser defaults to reject cookies “would ensure 
that people understood the privacy risks of cookies”); Paul M. Schwartz , Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2055, 2100 (2004) (“This Article prefers an opt-in default because . . . it would place pressure on the better-
informed party to disclose material information about how personal data will be used. This default promises to force the 
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B.   SCOPE AND GRANULARITY OF DEFAULT AND AVAILABLE OPT-OUT POSITIONS 
When setting a default position, policymakers must also consider the issue of scope, both as to 
the initial default and as to the available opt-out position or positions. The costs and benefits of 
tracking might vary for different types of information collected (e.g., geolocation data, clickstream 
data,
125 medical data, email content), uses of information (e.g., medical research, marketing, pricing, 
website use analytics, employment), collection sites (e.g., particular websites, mobile applications), 
types of users of information (e.g., first-party entities with which consumers intend to interact, 
affiliates  of  first-parties,  third-parties  to  which  first-parties  sell  data  or  access  to  data
126),  and 
individual users (particular firms or other entities).
127  The default could be set broadly to Track-Me 
(or  Do-Not-Track)  for  most  types,  uses,  collection  sites,  user  types,  and  individual  users  of 
information, or a mix of narrower defaults and unalterable positions could be employed. Where a 
position is a default, the policymaker must further consider whether a consumer can or must be 
given the opportunity to opt out broadly or selectively, again along any of these dimensions.  
Consider the policymaker’s decision about whether to require firms to give consumers choice, or 
to set (or allow firms to set) an unalterable position. For some information, policymakers might 
decide that the benefits of tracking are outweighed by costs, regardless of consumer preferences, and 
therefore set an unalterable Do-Not-Track position for that information. For example, tracking of 
sexual orientation or medical data for employment purposes could be generally prohibited. For other 
data, policymakers might decide that the benefits of tracking strongly outweigh any costs, and thus 
set an unalterable Track-Me position. For example, firms might be permitted to track clickstream 
data for website analytics purposes, without giving consumers an ability to opt out.  
Despite  the  overarching  policymaker  goal  of  individual  personal  data  privacy  choice,  no 
proposal to date appears to contemplate giving consumers complete control over tracking. Instead, 
all proposals retain some categories of information tracking from which consumers cannot opt out.  
For example, the current W3C’s draft proposal would allow consumers to opt out of tracking only 
with  respect  to  certain  data  collected  by  third  parties  for  certain  purposes,  such  as  behavioral 
advertising, and geolocation data more granular than the zip code level collected by third parties for 
any purpose. First parties can continue to collect any and all data and can customize content and 
advertising  based  on  the  consumer’s  interaction  with  that  firm.
128 Third  parties  can  continue  to 
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125 Clickstream data refers to the information generated by users’ mouse movements and clicks through the website 
they  visit,  as  well  as  the  sites  visited,  duration  of  the  visit  and  order  of  site  visits.  Definition:  Clickstream  Analysis, 
SEARCHCRM, http://searchcrm.techtarget.com/definition/clickstream-analysis (last visited Aug. 1, 2013).  
126 But given that third parties can become affiliates of first parties and that first parties can act as the handmaidens of 
third parties, tracking defaults that turn on these distinctions may be subverted. Cf. Mitch Weinstein, Why Blocking Third-
Party Cookies Is Good for Google and Facebook, ADEXCHANGER (June 20, 2013), http://www.adexchanger.com/data-driven-
thinking/why-blocking-third-party-cookies-is-good-for-google-and-facebook/. 
127 The original collection of data can be regulated, and/or downstream users or uses can be regulated. Enforcement 
concerns would push toward limiting the original collection of data, even where only some potential downstream users 
or uses are problematic.  However, to present the strongest case for the use of tracking defaults, this article sets aside 
these enforcement concerns.  See supra note __. 
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collect data for “permitted purposes,” including frequency capping (measuring how many times a 
consumer has been shown an ad), billing (to ensure third-party advertisers are paying first-party 
websites  correctly),  and  debugging,  and  can  continue  to  collect  gross  geolocation  data  for  any 
purpose.
129 Consumers cannot opt out of any tracking by first parties, tracking of gross geolocation 
data  by  any  party,  or  tracking  for  “permissible  purposes”  by  third  parties.  Similarly,  the  FTC 
tracking proposal allows first parties to collect and use information about consumers without giving 
consumers an opportunity to opt out where “the practice [of data collection and use] is consistent 
with the context of the transaction or the consumer’s existing relationship with the business, or is 
required or specifically authorized by law.”
130 Contextually-appropriate uses not requiring consumer 
choice  would  include  the  collection  and  use  of  data  for  the  purposes  of  “fulfillment,  fraud 
prevention,  internal  operations,  legal  compliance  and  public  purpose,  and  most  first-party 
marketing.”
131 These types of limitations on the extent to which consumers can control tracking may 
be necessary to avoid giving consumers the impression they must accept all tracking in order to 
receive a benefit that most consumers want, such as for their orders to be filled or fraud prevention.  
However, allowing consumers to opt out of some but not all tracking could also be confusing and 
lead to a sense that opting out is futile. 
Within  the  set  of  potentially  tracked  information  about  which  policymakers  wish  to  give 
consumers control, policymakers then must decide which defaults should be Track-Me and which 
should  be  Do-Not-Track.  For  example,  the  FTC  has  suggested  that  the  default  for  sensitive 
information--“information about children, financial and health information, Social Security numbers, 
and  precise  geolocation  data”--should  be  Do-Not-Track,  thus  requiring  express  consent  from 
consumers before the information can be collected.
132 The proposed default for the collection of 
nonsensitive information by third parties (or affiliates of first parties where the affiliate relationship 
is not obvious to consumers) or by first parties tracking consumers across third-party websites, or 
for first parties sharing nonsensitive information with third parties, would be Track-Me.
133  Thus, for 
example, first parties would need to obtain consumer consent before collecting sensitive data and 
would need to give consumers an opportunity to opt out of sharing nonsensitive data with third 
parties. 
Once policymakers decide to allow consumers to opt out of a particular type of information 
tracking,  they  then  must  decide  the  scope  of  the  opt-out  mechanism.  Opting  out  of  a  default 
wholesale might be the only alternative given to consumers, or consumers might be permitted to opt 
out narrowly. For example, a consumer might be given the power to opt out of a Track-Me or Do-
Not-Track default as to third parties while continuing to be tracked by first parties, and/or to opt 
out on a firm-by-firm basis.  To the extent that tracking is performed through cookie technology, 
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129 Id. at § 5, Third-Party Compliance. 
130 FTC Privacy Report, supra note __ at 38-39. 
131 Id. at 39. 
132 FTC Privacy Report at 59. 
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common web browser setting choices today give consumers the ability to opt out on both of these 
bases. For example, in Firefox today, a consumer can choose to accept no cookies, accept cookies 
from first parties but not third parties, accept all cookies, and/or make exceptions from each of 
these for particular websites.
134      
The broader the tracking default setting and opt-out mechanism, the more easily it is understood 
by consumers, but the more likely that consumers will be unable to satisfy their textured preferences. 
For example, a Do-Not-Track default setting that prohibits all passive personal data collection is 
intuitive, but most consumers want some tracking for some purposes (e.g., geolocational tracking to 
locate a lost or stolen mobile device, clickstream data tracking for the purposes of pre- or re-
populating online forms). A scheme of narrow defaults, such as a different setting for each potential 
use or user of each potential type of data, or a broad default with a granular set of selective opt-out 
options,  would  allow  sophisticated  consumers  to  satisfy  particular  preferences,  but  presents  the 
danger of overwhelming the average consumer.
135  
Given that the overarching goal of the use of personal data defaults is to facilitate individual 
choice about whether, when, and by whom to be tracked, it seems likely that policymakers will 
create  a  scheme  by  which  consumers  can  selectively  opt  in  or  out  of  tracking  defaults. 
Unsurprisingly, most tracking default proposals permit consumers to, in effect, opt out on a firm-by-
firm basis. Regarding tracking of mobile devices, the FTC has suggested that the default for some 
information be Track-Me, that consumers be permitted to opt out from this wholesale, but that 
consumers then be permitted to opt back into tracking on an application-by-application basis: 
A  DNT  setting  placed  at  the  platform  level  could  give  consumers  …  a  way  to 
control the transmission of information to third parties as consumers are using apps 
on their mobile devices. …Offering this setting or control through the platform will 
allow consumers to make a one-time selection rather than having to make decisions 
on  an  app-by-app  basis.  Apps  that  wish  to  offer  services  to  consumers  that  are 
supported by behavioral advertising would remain free to engage potential customers 
in a dialogue to explain the value of behavioral tracking and obtain consent to engage 
in such tracking.
136  
The  W3C  proposal  is  similar.  To  the  extent  that  it  gives  consumers  control  over  tracking,  it 
effectively sets Track-Me as the default and requires that the option to opt out be made available to 
consumers at the browser level.
137 Consumers who select the Do-Not-Track position at the browser 
level would then be permitted to opt back into the Track-Me position wholesale or selectively.
138 If 
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134 Go to Firefox, Options, Privacy.  As previously noted, however, trackers can track through other means than 
cookies, such as through digital fingerprinting.  See Cookie has 5 years to live, supra, and fingerprinting source, supra. 
135 For example, when Facebook added more granular privacy controls, users became confused and were more likely to 
stick with default settings. See Stutzman et al., supra note 76, at 23. 
136 FTC Mobile Report at 21. 
137 W3C Technical Specifications, at § 6, User Granted Exceptions. 
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the default were Do-Not-Track, a comparable scheme might be to give consumers both a wholesale 
opt-out choice, allowing them to opt into the Track-Me position with respect to all firms, and a 
granular choice, allowing them to opt out on a firm-by-firm basis.  
C.   ALTERING AND FRAMING RULES 
Policymakers would then need to select framing and altering rules for these defaults. Recall that 
the goals of such rules are to prevent the default from being too sticky or too slippery and to inform 
consumers about the default and opting out. Given that the tracking defaults and opt-out choices 
policymakers  appear  likely  to  embrace  are  complex,  ensuring  that  consumers  understand  their 
choices and are able to act on them is likely to be a demanding task.  While the theoretically possible 
altering  and  framing  rules  are  limitless,  this  section  sketches  the  general  contours  of  the  rules 
policymakers are likely to select. 
First, policymakers are likely to put rules in place that aim to make the default and opportunity 
to  opt  out  visible  and  perhaps  even  salient.  For  example,  rules  might  require  the  default  and 
opportunity  to  opt  out  to  be  “prominent”
 139--disclosed  in  words  that  “are  of  a  type,  size,  and 
location sufficiently noticeable for an ordinary consumer to read and comprehend them, in print 
that contrasts highly with the background on which they appear”
 140 The FTC proposal suggests that 
the choice to be opt out must be given to consumers “at a time and in a context relevant to the 
consumer’s decision about whether to allow data collection and use,” such as “directly adjacent to 
where  the  consumer  is  entering  his  or  her  data  [online],”  “immediately  upon  signing  up  for  a 
service,” or, for on offline transaction, “close to the time of sale” through notification on a “sales 
receipt” or “prominent poster at the location where the transaction takes place.”
 141  
Second, to forestall the confusion that can make defaults overly sticky, policymakers are likely to 
require that the mechanism for opting out be “easy to find and use.”
 142 More particularly, firms 
might be required to create an opt-out process that involves no more than one or two clicks of a 
tangible or virtual button to opt out.
143 The opt-out process might be standardized, at least to some 
extent, across browsers, websites, mobile devices, or applications. Or the process for opting back 
into  the  default  after  having  opted  out  might  be  regulated  so  that  firms  could  not  change  a 
consumer’s position through unread fine print.  For example, while the W3C default scheme does 
not contain rules regarding the process for opting out of the default,
144 it does require that where a 
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139 See FTC Privacy Report at 50.  See also In the Matter of ScanScout, Inc., FTC Fo. 102 3185 (2011) (Consent Order), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023185/111221scanscoutdo.pdf  [hereinafter  “ScanScout  consent  order”]  (requiring 
“prominent” placement of a notification about a default and opt-out mechanism). 
140 ScanScout consent order. 
141 FTC Privacy Report at 50. 
142 See FTC Mobile Report at __. 
143 See ScanScout consent order. 
144 See W3C Technical Specifications, at § 3, Determining User Preference (“We do not specify how tracking preference 
choices are offered to the user or how the preference is enabled: each implementation is responsible for determining the 
user experience by which a tracking preference is enabled. For example, a user might select a check-box in their user 
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consumer has opted out at the browser level, opting back in to a Track Me position with respect to 
any particular firm must be done “explicit[ly].”
145  
Rules  aimed  at  visibility  and  eliminating  confusion  would  simultaneously  work  to  inform 
consumers  about  the  default  and  opt-out  opportunity.    For  example,  the  W3C  default  scheme 
requires firms that track consumers and all browsers to “clearly and accurately” with a “brief and 
neutral explanatory text” explain that a consumer can opt out of some third-party tracking, that a 
consumer who has opted out may continue to be tracked for “permissible” purposes, and that a 
consumer who has opted out at the browser level can opt back in with respect to a particular firm.
146 
Where a consumer has opted out of tracking at the browser level, the consumer’s opting back in 
selectively must be “informed.”
147 
Third, policymakers might put rules in place intended to minimize the costs of opting out.  For 
example,  rules  might  require  that  consumers  be  given  a  “universal”  opt-out  mechanism  at  the 
browser or device level, such that opting out once opts the consumer out of all tracking by websites 
viewed with that browser or applications used on that mobile device.
 148 A universal mechanism 
would also present consumers with a broadly-bracketed choice, perhaps leading to more privacy-
minded decisions.  To keep the cost of opting out low, rules might require the opt-out mechanism 
be “persistent,”
149 meaning that firms could not require consumers to opt out repeatedly the way 
that cookie-based opt-out systems do today. 
In  theory,  a  Track-Me  or  Do-Not-Track  default  might  also  prohibit  firms  from  giving 
consumers incentives to agree to tracking. The law might require firms to treat consumers in the 
Do-Not-Track position the same as consumers in the Track-Me position, other than as to the 
particular  purposes  for  which  the  firm  tracks  consumers.  However,  when  the  existence  of  the 
content  and  features  of  a  website  or  app  currently  depends  on  revenue  generated  by  tracking, 
policymakers  are  unlikely  to  want  to  undermine  this  arrangement.  The  W3C  default  scheme 
explicitly permits firms to condition services on consumers agreeing to be tracked, either by staying 
in the Track-Me default position or by explicitly consenting to tracking by that firm, for just this 
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agent's configuration, install an extension or add-on that is specifically designed to add a tracking preference expression, 
or make a choice for privacy that then implicitly includes a tracking preference (e.g., Privacy settings: high). The user-
agent might ask the user for their preference during startup, perhaps on first use or after an update adds the tracking 
protection feature. Likewise, a user might install or configure a proxy to add the expression to their own outgoing 
requests.”) 
145 W3C Functional Specifications, at § 6, User Granted Exceptions 
146 W3C Functional Specifications, at § 3, User Agent Compliance. 
147 W3C Functional Specifications, at § 6, User Granted Exceptions. 
148 See FTC Mobile Report at __ (suggesting a universal mechanism to opt out of the Track-Me default be made 
available at the mobile device level). 
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reason.
150 With  a  narrow  exception  for  “important  product[s]  with  few  substitutes,  such  as  a 
patented medical device,” the FTC proposal also asserts that firms should be permitted to condition 
goods,  services,  website  content,  etc.  on  consumers  agreeing  to  tracking  and  to  offer  tracked 
consumers lower prices or other benefits.
151 
Moreover, if differential treatment beyond perks incident to the purposes for which the firm 
tracks consumers were prohibited, the line between these perks and those that cross the line into 
incentives to agree to tracking could be difficult to police. Firms could provide consumers who 
agreed to be tracked with many perks that are arguably incident to the “purposes” for which the 
consumers are being tracked. For example, apps or websites could be optimized for functioning 
when  tracking  is  enabled.  A  search  engine  might  display  websites  in  the  consumer’s  language 
automatically only if the consumer consents to tracking.
152 Or a website might deliver consumers 
who consent to tracking behaviorally targeted ads and serve untracked consumers a larger quantity 
of contextual ads. Detecting when the larger quantity is necessary to produce revenue equivalent to 
behavioral ads and when it is harassment to induce consumers to agree to tracking might not be 
possible.  Thus, even if altering rules prohibited the use of perks or differential treatment to give 
consumers  an  incentive  to  agree  to  tracking,  enforcing  this  prohibition  would  likely  prove 
impossible. 
 
V.   DEFAULTS IN PRACTICE 
Defaults in practice do not always live up to the theory behind using defaults in policymaking. 
This  Part  describes  two  failed  default  schemes,  demonstrates  how  firms  have  frustrated  these 
schemes by making the defaults too sticky or too slippery, and, through comparison to examples of 
relatively successful defaults, extracts a set of conditions under which defaults do not perform in 
accordance with theory.  
A.   TWO FAILED DEFAULT SCHEMES 
Two failed default schemes are the defaults (a) for the sharing and use of consumer information 
by financial institutions and (b) for bank overdraft programs. The former is excessively sticky, and 
the latter is too slippery. Neither appear to lead to well-informed consumer decisions about whether 
to stick with the default or opt out.
153  
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150 W3C Technical Specifications at § 1, Introduction (“Web sites that are unwilling or unable to offer content without 
such targeted advertising or data collection need a mechanism to indicate those requirements to the user and allow them 
(or their user agent) to make an individual choice regarding exceptions.”). 
151 FTC Privacy Report at 52. 
152 Cf. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (last modified June 24, 2013) (“However, it’s 
important to remember that many of our services may not function properly if your cookies are disabled. For example, 
we may not remember your language preferences.”).  
153 By  other  metrics,  these  defaults  may  have  done  some  good.  For  example,  they  may  have  led  more  financial 
institutions to share less consumer information or more banks to stop charging overdraft fees than would otherwise 
have occurred. See Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L. REV. 101 (2002) 
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a. Financial information defaults: By default, financial institutions collect, use, and share information 
about their customers for marketing, pricing, and other purposes. Under federal law, consumers can 
opt out of this in three respects. First, they can opt out to prevent an institution from sharing their 
personal information with parties that are not affiliated with the institution.
154 Second, they can 
refuse to permit an institution to share with its affiliates information about the consumer other than 
information about the institution’s own transactions with the consumer.
155 Third, they can opt out of 
the  use  by  an  institution’s  affiliates  of  transaction  and  “other”  information  for  marketing 
purposes.
156 Even if a consumer has opted out to the fullest extent, financial institutions can share all 
information with joint marketing partners, transaction information with affiliates for non-marketing 
purposes, and “as [further] permitted by law.”
157  
The defaults are surrounded by altering and framing rules intended to inform consumers and to 
allow those consumers who prefer to opt out to do so. Institutions must allow consumers to opt out 
at  any  time  and  must  provide  consumers  with  a  “reasonable  means”  to  do  so.
158 A  toll-free 
telephone number or a detachable form with a check-off box is a “reasonable means”; requiring the 
consumer  to  write  a  letter  is  not.
159 Institutions  must  give  consumers  initial  and  annual  notices 
explaining  their  opt-out  rights.
160 These  notices  must  be  “clear  and  conspicuous,”  meaning 
“reasonably understandable” (in plain language and easy to read) and “designed to call attention to 
the nature and significance of the information” (distinctive in appearance and, if online, located 
either  on  a  website  page  that  consumers  use  often  or  hyperlinked  directly  from  a  page  where 
transactions are conducted).
161  
But despite these rules, the financial information defaults appear to be too sticky and are not 
information-forcing.  Consumers  reviewing  model  explanatory  notices  in  laboratory  conditions 
poorly understand the defaults and opt-out provisions.
162 Comprehension is likely to be even lower 
under real-world conditions, in which many consumers will not read the notices. Further, although 
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(making this argument as to the financial information defaults). But by the metric of well-informed consumer decisions, 
the ostensible goal of policymakers, they have failed. 
154 Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 16 C.F.R. § 313 (2000). 
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 16 C.F.R. § 313.15(4).  
158 16 C.F.R. § 313.7. 
159 Id. 
160 16 C.F.R. §§ 313.4–5. 
161 16 C.F.R. § 313.3. 
162 Alan Levy & Manoj Hastak, Consumer Comprehension of Financial Privacy Notices, INTERAGENCY NOTICE PROJECT, 9 
table  1  (2008),  http://ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/Levy-Hastak-Report.pdf  (showing  that  less  than  half  the 
subjects tested were able to select a bank for a cogent and relevant reason based on even the best form notice regulators 
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consumers generally do not like banks sharing their information with affiliates or third parties,
163 
almost no one opts out.
164  
b. Checking Account Overdraft Default: As explained above, federal banking regulators effectively 
require  banks  to  default  consumers  out  of  bank-funded  overdraft  coverage  for  ATM  and 
nonrecurring debit card transactions.
165 Regulators consciously supported the overdraft default with 
rules intended to prevent bank “circumvention or evasion” of the default.
166 First, to prevent banks 
from placing language opting out of the default in routinely unread account disclosures, opting out 
requires an “affirmative” accountholder action, such as speaking to a bank representative in person 
or by phone or clicking a box on an online banking form.
167 Second, banks must provide the same 
account terms, conditions, and features to accountholders who stick with the default as they provide 
to accountholders who opt out.
168 Framing rules require banks to provide consumers with specific 
information  about  the  default  and  the  consequences  of  opting  out  in  a  document  or  webpage 
segregated from all other documents or webpages.
169  
In promulgating the overdraft default, regulators explicitly stated that they intended for it to 
operate  as  a  policy  default,  akin  to  the  auto-enrollment  default  for  retirement  savings.
170 But  it 
appears  that  the  majority  of  the  consumers  whom  regulators  intended  to  assist—low-income 
frequent users of overdraft
171—opt out of the default.
172 The rule also does not function as a penalty 
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163 Id. at 15 (in consumer testing, finding that respondents “do not seem to like their information being shared with 
nonaffiliates . . . or affiliates”). 
164  John  Martin,  Opting  Out—or  Not,  ABCNEWS  (June  21,  2001), 
http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/dailynews/privacy_notices_010621.html  (finding  only  .5%  of  people  opt 
out).  
165 Electronic Fund Transfers, 12 C.F.R. § 205.17(b). Fees on bank-covered overdrafts occasioned by other types of 
transactions (chiefly checks and recurring payments) are not included in the policy default, see Supplement I to Part 205, 
Official Staff Interpretations of 12 CFR § 205.17(b)(2), Comment 2, because these tend to be for necessities and, if not 
paid,  can  result  in  bounced  check  or  late  payment  fees.  ATM  and  nonrecurring  debit  transactions  tend  to  be 
discretionary transactions and when these are declined consumers are not charged a fee. Overdraft Final Rule 2009, supra 
note __, at 59040. 
166 Overdraft Final Rule 2009, supra note 165(?), at 59044. 
167 Requirement for Overdraft Services, 12 C.F.R. § 205.17(b)(1)(iii); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 205, Supp. I, comment 17(b)(1)—4.  
168 12 C.F.R. § 205.17(b)(3). 
169 12 C.F.R. § 205.17(b)(3). 
170 Regulators noted that “studies have suggested [that] consumers are likely to adhere to the established default rule, 
that  is,  the  outcome  that  would  apply  if  the  consumer  takes  no  action”  and  cited  studies  of  the  effectiveness  of 
automatic enrollment in increasing participation in retirement savings plans. Overdraft Final Rule 2009, 59038 & n. 25. 
171 In 2009, one widely-cited industry consultant estimated that 90% of overdraft fees were paid by the poorest 10% of 
checking accountholders. See Editorial, Debit Card Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2009) (citing Michael Moebs).  
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default; surveys indicate that consumers who opt out of the default understand it extremely poorly, 
holding key misconceptions about the way the default and opt-out positions work.
173  
B.   HOW FIRMS MAKE THESE DEFAULTS FAIL 
Why  have  these  defaults  failed?  An  examination  of  how  these  defaults  are  presented  to 
consumers in practice demonstrates that the mechanisms that sometimes operate to make defaults 
sticky can be bolstered or undermined. Institutions work to bolster these mechanisms to ensure very 
few  consumers  opt  out  of  the  financial  information  default;  banks  work  to  undermine  these 
mechanisms to encourage accountholders to opt out of the overdraft coverage default.  
a.  Transaction  Barriers.  Transaction barriers that can contribute to the stickiness of defaults—
costs, confusion, and futility—can be built higher, eliminated, or even inverted.  
In the case of the financial information defaults, institutions prefer for consumers to stay in the 
default information-sharing position, and therefore build transaction barriers to opting out high. For 
consumers who attempt to opt out, the altering rule requiring “reasonable means” for opting out 
keeps the transaction costs of doing so for any one institution fairly low.
174 But consumers must opt 
out with each financial institution with which they do or have done business. If transaction costs are 
not enough, institutions warn consumers that opting out will be costly in other ways: 
If you opt out:  
We may need you to repeat information that you have already provided and we may not be 
able to pre-fill applications for you.  
We may have to transfer your phone calls more often.  
We may not offer you the products that best meet your needs.
175 
  Perhaps the largest barrier is invisibility of the option to opt out; even in the flurry of 
publicity when the notices first went out, fewer than 35% of consumers surveyed recalled receiving 
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only debit card and ATM transactions.”).  
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Form  of  Opt-Out  Notice,  FIRST  FOUNDATION,  https://www.ff-inc.com/privacy/opt-out-notice.aspx;  Opting  Out  of 
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time, particularly for closed accounts.  
175 How  to  Enable  Your  Cookies,  U.S.  AUTOMOBILE  ASSOC., 
https://www.usaa.com/inet/ent_references/CpStaticPages?PAGEID=cp_netprivacy_pub&akredirect=true (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2013).  WHY NOT PRIVACY BY DEFAULT NOV3.DOCX  11/4/13 12:50 PM 
33	 ﾠ
them.  .
176 Although  the  law  requires  that  consumers  be  given  initial  and  annual  “conspicuous” 
notices, these arrive with a heap of other documents from the institution, and this heap is among the 
reams of disclosures consumers receive, and routinely ignore, in their daily lives.
177 Confusion about 
the opt-out process and/or about the terms that apply by default also may play a role; as noted 
above, consumers understand the default and their opt-out rights poorly, even after reading the 
required notices. That consumers cannot entirely opt out of the sharing of their information with 
joint marketing partners and affiliates could lead to a sense of futility; a consumer might think “why 
bother opting out when the institution can still share my data anyway?” 
Banks structure the presentation of the overdraft default and the process for opting out to have 
the opposite effect. Transaction costs do not make the default sticky because banks eliminate these 
for many consumers, and even make it more costly to stick with the default than to opt out. For new 
customers and for accountholders using online banking, transaction costs do not fortify the default 
because these costs are the same whether the consumer sticks with the default or opts out; new 
accountholders  in  the  process  of  opening  an  account  or  existing  accountholders  attempting  to 
access online banking must check precisely the same number of boxes regardless of whether they 
check the box for sticking with the default or for opting out.
178 In addition, some banks flood 
consumers with marketing encouraging them to opt out, calling them at home or approaching them 
when they visit a branch.
179 The barrage only ends when the consumer opts out,
180 with the effect 
that it is costlier to stick with the default—and continue to endure the marketing—than to opt out. 
Almost half of surveyed consumers who reported that they had opted out of the default did so at 
least in part to stop receiving overdraft marketing.
181  
 Confusion does not make the default sticky, because banks ensure that the opt-out process is 
visible and easy to use. The barrage of overdraft marketing makes the option to opt out difficult to 
miss. Existing accountholders can opt-out easily, by pushing a button on an ATM,
182 clicking a 
button online, or saying “yes” to a bank employee who calls to suggest to accountholders that they 
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ought to opt out.
183 Any confusion would likely run toward opting out, as banks frame the opt-out 
position as being a perk that the bank is volunteering to provide, asking accountholders whether 
they  would  like  to  take  advantage  of  the  bank’s  “courtesy  pay,”
184 “account  protector,”
185 or 
similarly-named  “service.”  To  the  extent  futility  has  an  effect,  it  might  cut  against  the  default; 
because consumers can still be charged overdraft fees for checks and automatic debits, consumers 
trying to avoid overdraft fees might perceive sticking with the default as the futile option. b. Judgment 
and Decision Biases. Firms that benefit from defaults will seek to harness judgment and decision biases 
to keep consumers in those defaults. But firms that oppose defaults can defuse these biases or even 
flip them to push consumers out of the default position. 
Institutions  faced  with  the  financial  information  defaults  work  to  ensure  that  these  biases 
support the defaults. For example, one financial institution’s opt-out notice appears designed to 
trigger loss aversion and the endowment effect. It explains: 
[We are] known for [our] exceptional member service. Sharing member information as we 
have outlined here enables us to maintain this service excellence . . . 
However, federal law also requires that we allow you to opt out . . . Limiting our ability to 
share  financial  information . . .  will  make  it  difficult  for  us  to  serve  you  as  you  might 
expect.
186 
By suggesting that sticking with the defaults will “maintain” the status quo and that opting out will 
be a departure from what the consumer “might expect,” the text suggests that the consumer’s 
expectations—the reference point from which she should measure gains and losses—ought to be 
the default positions and that opting out will cause her to lose benefits she now has.
187  
Next,  financial  institutions  encourage  procrastination  and  decision  avoidance.  The  reason  the  law 
requires consumers to be given the opportunity to opt out at any time is to reduce transaction 
barriers. But institutions may emphasize this fact to encourage procrastination
188—if a consumer can 
opt out at any time, she need not decide and take action immediately. Further, although framing 
rules require the opt-out notices themselves to be “reasonably understandable,” institutions can 
make the opt-out decision appear complex and overwhelming. Some institutions offer a plethora of 
“privacy policies” that consumers must wade through to understand their opt-out rights.
189 Others 
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surround  the  required  notice  with  voluminous  “explanations”  that  are  difficult  to  read  and 
understand.
190 Such complexity encourages procrastination and decision avoidance.  
In the face of the overdraft default, on the other hand, banks have waged a masterful marketing 
campaign designed to negate or reverse the biases that can sometimes make defaults sticky. First, 
banks reposition loss aversion and the endowment effect to encourage opting out, using two strategies. 
One was to pitch opting out prior to the date on which the new legal default rule became effective, 
thus framing the choice as between keeping an existing endowed position or accepting a change by 
agreeing  to  the  new  default.
191 In  their  marketing,  banks  explicitly  invoked  loss  aversion  to 
encourage opting out with copy such as “Don’t lose your ATM and Debit Card Overdraft Protection”
192 
and asking accountholders whether they wanted to “keep [their] account working the same” or 
“change [their] account.”
193 The other is to frame opting out not as losing an endowed position but 
as  gaining  the  bank’s  “courtesy  pay,”
194 “account  protector,”
195 or  similarly-named  “service”  by 
“opting in.”  
Second, banks harness choice bracketing and play on discounting to spur opting out. Consumers are 
given the choice whether to accept overdraft coverage for any and all ATM and debit transactions 
that might overdraft the account, rather than on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
196 This broad 
choice bracketing directs consumers’ focus to the question of whether they might ever need overdraft 
coverage (e.g., for an emergency), favoring opting out. If instead, consumers were faced with narrow 
decisions about whether to accept overdraft coverage and fees for particular transactions, consumers 
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could selectively use overdraft for emergencies and decline it for a cup of coffee. Broad choice 
bracketing also makes the benefits of opting out appear immediate and certain and the costs delayed 
and uncertain. Bank advertising includes themes along the lines of “Privilege Pay works like a safety 
net for your checking account . . . so you don't get left stranded at a gas station”
197—thus offering 
accountholders immediate “peace of mind” 
198 that funds will be available in an emergency if the 
consumer  opts  out.
199 In  contrast,  banks  downplay  the  costs  of  overdrafting,  emphasizing  that 
opting out of the default and into the bank’s overdraft program is a “free” perk and that consumers 
incur no fee unless they use the “service.”
200  
Third, rather than allowing procrastination, decision avoidance, and salience and omission bias to lead to 
inertia, banks place some consumers in a mandated choice scenario and give others deadlines and/or 
encouragement to act. Some banks require new customers and accountholders attempting to use 
online banking to make a choice between opting in to the bank’s overdraft service or declining that 
service before they can open an account or continue to use online banking. These accountholders 
are  forced  to  take  action  and  cannot  procrastinate  or  avoid  making  the  decision.  For  existing 
accountholders who do not use online banking, bank marketing frames the decision as one that 
must  be  made  immediately  or  by  a  certain  deadline.
201 Bank  marketing  trumpets  “It’s  your 
choice!”,
202 implying that sticking with the default is a choice, not a blameless omission.  
Fourth, banks use explicit messaging so that the illusion  of  control  instigates opting out. Bank 
marketing emphasizes that consumers are “in control” of their overdraft decisions
203 and implies 
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that opting out gives consumers more control than sticking with the default.
204 Because the feeling 
of control encourages riskier behavior, to the extent that consumers understand that they are taking 
a risk of incurring overdraft fees these marketing messages could encourage them to opt out. 
c.  Preference  Formation  Effects.  As  with  transaction  barriers  and  biases,  the  preference-forming 
effects of defaults can be bolstered or undermined. 
Institutions bolster any advice implicit in the financial information defaults with explicit advice 
to consumers that their privacy is already protected and they need not opt out.
205 Documents and 
webpages accompanying the financial information default notices commonly emphasize foremost 
that the institution cares about the consumer’s privacy.
206 For example, although a close read of one 
institution’s required notice reveals that the institution shares consumer information to the fullest 
extent permitted by law (i.e., with joint marketing partners, affiliates, and non-affiliates, and for both 
marketing and non-marketing purposes), the webpage from which this notice can be accessed begins 
boldly:  “SAFEGUARDING  YOUR  PRIVACY”  and  continues  “[WE]  TAKE[]  OUR 
COMMITMENT TO PROTECTING YOUR PRIVACY SERIOUSLY”.
207 
Institutions explicitly advise consumers that they will benefit by not opting out. For example, 
one  institution  explains  that  sharing  information  with  affiliates  provides  customers  with  the 
following benefits: 
Prevention of unauthorized transactions or fraud. 
Account upgrades with additional benefits. 
Offers for products and services specifically suited to your individual situation…. 
Increased convenience, making it faster and easier for you to do business with us…. 
Enhanced customer service and responsiveness.
208  
The  implication  is  that  consumers  who  opt  out  of  information  sharing  will  not  receive  these 
benefits. 
In contrast, banks cast the overdraft default so as to negate the preference-forming effects of 
defaults. Banks typically present accountholders with two checkboxes, one for “opting in” to the 
bank’s “overdraft protection” and another for “opting out,” thus concealing which position is the 
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default.
209 Further, banks advise accountholders that the opt-out position, rather than the default, is 
in accountholders’ best interests, with copy such as “overdraft privilege is designed with you in 
mind.”
210 
Finally, banks pressed existing accountholders to opt out of the overdraft policy default before it 
came into effect and they experienced it, and force new customers to make a decision when they 
open an account. Without living with the default and perhaps discovering that purchases can be 
foregone or that alternative, cheaper sources of overdraft coverage are available, experience does not 
induce accountholders to choose the default.  
C.   SUCCESSFUL DEFAULTS 
Of  course,  many  default  schemes  do  work  well.  Two  well-known  examples  are  the  above-
mentioned retirement savings auto-enrollment default and the Do Not Call registry. 
Automatic  Enrollment  in  Retirement  Savings  Plans:  Auto-enrollment  allows  employers  to  default 
employees into participation in defined contribution pension plans at a default contribution rate with 
a default allocation of investments, rather than waiting for employees to sign up on their own.
211 
This policy default scheme is surrounded with framing rules designed to ensure that it is not too 
sticky, including a requirement that every employee who is enrolled by default be given regular 
notices of the right to opt out, change their contribution rate, or reallocate their investments. These 
notices must be written at a level that can be understood by the average employee, so that the 
opportunity to opt out is not confusing or invisible.
212 
Auto-enrollment  has  been  extremely  successful  in  its  goal  of  increasing  the  number  of 
employees in the default position. As noted above, employers that have made participation in their 
plans the default have increased their employee participation rates dramatically.
213 The increase has 
been largest for lower-income consumers, which has been interpreted as evidence that defaults are 
most helpful for those who need the most help.
214  
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Do  Not  Call:  Another  popular  default  scheme  is  the  Do  Not  Call  Registry.  By  default, 
telemarketers can call people to try to sell to them at their homes, but consumers can stop most of 
these calls by opting out of the default and into the Do Not Call list. The process for opting out of 
the default and into the Do Not Call list is well known, low-cost and easy—consumers can call a 
toll-free  number  or  register  online.
215 Consumers  can  opt  back  into  the  default  wholesale  by 
removing their number from the list, or selectively opt back into the default and allow a particular 
firm to telemarket to them through written explicit consent.
216 Because this consent must be in 
writing, the effect is that telemarketers cannot call consumers and convince them to opt back in and 
then immediately attempt to sell to them. 
Although not a penalty default, in that firms do not oppose the default and therefore do not 
have an incentive to educate consumers, Do Not Call was heavily publicized in the press, and the 
public responded. Despite having to  take some action to opt into the list, consumers placed ten 
million phone numbers on it in the first four days it was operative,
217 and today over seventy percent 
of Americans have placed their numbers on the list.
218 Further, it appears that the default sorts 
consumers reasonably well. Those consumers who do not sign up have the least to gain by doing so, 
because they tend to receive fewer telemarketing calls; those who have much to gain opt out.
219  
D.  CRACKS IN THE THEORY BEHIND THE USE OF DEFAULTS 
From the forgoing examples, we can see that defaults are not always sticky or information-
forcing. What drives the rift between theory and practice, and why? This section explains why some 
defaults fail, and then takes this lesson as an opportunity to re-examine the theories behind the use 
of defaults in policymaking. 
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1.  Conditions Where Defaults Do Not Work. 
The key difference between the automatic enrollment and Do Not Call default schemes on the 
one hand, and the financial information and overdraft defaults on the other is the presence of 
parties that have (1) a strong interest in whether the consumer sticks with or opts out of the default 
and (2) access to consumers so as to shape the presentation of the default and the process for opting 
out. No party with access to affected employees at the point of the auto-enrollment opt-out decision 
has a strong interest in pushing consumers in or out of the default. The employers that administer it 
want it to be sticky, but also do not have a strong reason to try to make it too sticky.
220 Do Not Call 
has enemies; telemarketers want consumers in the default position.221 But telemarketers do not 
shape the presentation of the Do Not Call list or the process for signing up; that is run entirely by 
the Federal Trade Commission. Nor do telemarketers have an effective way to reach consumers 
whose  numbers  are  on  the  list  to  lobby  or  confuse  them  into  selectively  opting  back  in  and 
permitting the particular firm to telemarket to them, given that consumers must give written, signed 
consent before a telemarketer can call them. 
The financial information and overdraft defaults, on the other hand, are implemented by the 
firms that want them to fail. Not all financial institutions share customer information with third 
parties or their affiliates, and not all of those that share with their affiliates allow those affiliates to 
use the information for marketing purposes. But the institutions that share customer information 
profit from it and so want to keep their customers in the defaults.
222 Not all banks charge overdraft 
fees, but many that do profit enormously from them, and thus have every reason to convince 
accountholders,  and  frequent  overdrafters  in  particular,  to  opt  out  of  the  overdraft  default.
223 
Financial institutions and banks both also have access to consumers at the time when consumers can 
opt out. They each use that access to shape the process for opting out and to frame the default at 
the point of consumer decision. While the law sets the default itself and some altering and framing 
rules, the institution or bank makes the last move before the consumer decides whether to opt out. 
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The party opposed to the default is thus able to use its access to powerfully influence the consumer’s 
ultimate position.  
2. Re-examining the Theories Supporting the Use of Defaults in Policymaking 
The financial information and overdraft defaults suggest that the theories underlying the use of 
policy defaults, penalty defaults, and even altering and framing rules, are flawed. The theory behind 
policy defaults is not only that they are sticky for the majority who are better off in the default 
position, but also that those consumers who truly prefer the opt-out position will opt out. The 
theory behind penalty defaults is not only that firms will try to convince consumers to opt out, but 
also that these firms will be forced to educate consumers in the process. The theory behind altering 
and framing rules is that they can calibrate the stickiness of defaults so that those and only those 
who  ought  to  opt  out  do  so,  and  can  ensure  defaults  are  information-forcing  by  requiring  the 
provision of information to consumers before they opt out. But many of these premises are true 
only if the consumer is well-informed and rational, suppositions at odds with most of the premises 
behind the use of defaults.  
A purely rational actor with known preferences facing a well-understood default and an easy and 
accessible opt-out position will opt out if and only if she is thereby better off. But given that the 
mechanisms that make defaults sticky include confusion, biased decision-making, and preference 
formation effects, and that the uninformed status of consumers is what calls for penalty defaults, it 
is not clear why those and only those who will be better off in the opt-out position will opt out or 
why they will be educated in the process of opting out. For example, individuals who do not know 
they can opt out or who are particularly prone to procrastination may not opt out, even if they 
would  be  better  off  doing  so,  thus  making  a  default  too  sticky.  In  situations  of  information 
asymmetry, the more knowledgeable firm may have opportunities to opt out the less knowledgeable 
consumer without exposing the default. That a consumer finds the decision environment and her 
own preferences opaque can make a default sticky because this opacity leaves her vulnerable to the 
mechanisms that can make defaults sticky. But it also means that the default may be too sticky and 
that she is more susceptible to biased decision-making when those biases run counter to the default 
position too. A firm opposing a penalty default may find it easier to alter the decision environment 
so as to push consumer biases to favor opting out than to inform and negotiate with the consumer. 
Most altering and framing rules aim to fine-tune transaction barriers or deliver information. But 
there are two problems with this approach. First, these rules make no attempt to alter the biases and 
preference formation effects that can make defaults sticky. Second, altering and framing rules meant 
to  alter  transaction  barriers  or  be  information-forcing  may  not  succeed.  For  example,  not  all 
affirmative actions will inhibit opting out; a reflexive click of a mouse could make a default overly 
slippery.  People  often  do  not  read  or  understand  the  information  presented  in  legally-required 
notices.
224 Thus, altering and framing rules are not always information-forcing, and in most instances 
cannot calibrate the stickiness or slipperiness of defaults well. 
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III.  WHY TRACKING DEFAULTS ARE LIKELY TO FAIL 
Currently,  transaction  barriers,  biases,  and  preference  formation  effects  make  the  Track-Me 
position too sticky. Would that change if Track-Me were to become a true policy default, with 
surrounding altering and framing rules to help those who ought to opt out to do so? To a degree 
yes,  because  some  existing  transaction  barriers  would  be  removed.  But  biases  and  preference 
formation effects would likely still give a Track-Me default considerable traction, and firms would 
likely find ways to erect some transaction barriers without running afoul of altering and framing 
rules. Moreover, if firms were required to respect a consumer’s decision to opt out of a Track-Me 
default, they would have a stronger incentive to convince consumers not to opt out than they do 
today. The greater effort firms would expend on keeping consumers in the default could lead fewer 
consumers to opt out than attempt to do so now. 
What  if  Do-Not-Track  were  the  default  instead?  Would  that  lead  to  consumers  sorting 
themselves  into  positions  that  reflect  their  well-informed  preferences?  While  a  Do-Not-Track 
default would require firms to spend significant resources on maneuvering consumers out of the 
default,  firms  determined  to  do  so  would  likely  be  successful,  without  necessarily  educating 
consumers along the way. 
Firms that want to track consumers would likely have access to consumers when consumers 
would  face  the  opt-out  choice  with  respect  to  that  firm  and  would  use  that  access  to  push 
consumers  to  stick  with  Track-Me  defaults  and  opt  out  of  Do-Not-Track  defaults.  The  FTC 
proposal, for example, assumes that in many circumstances, firms that track consumers will be 
presenting the default and opt-out choices to consumers. Even where consumers can opt out at the 
browser level or device level, both the W3C draft proposal and the FTC proposal contemplate that 
consumers  who  had  selected  the  Do-Not-Track  position  would  be  permitted  to  opt  back  into 
tracking by any particular entity by giving consent to that entity directly. Based on strategies firms 
have used to respond to existing defaults, this Part suggests strategies that firms could use to keep 
consumers in Track-Me defaults and to lead consumers to opt out of Do-Not-Track defaults. These 
suggestions are not definitive or exhaustive predictions; firm strategies would of necessity depend on 
subtle contextual details that cannot be known in advance. But the examples here give the flavor of 
strategies  firms  would  likely  use.  This  Part  then  turns  to  an  explanation  of  why  altering  rules, 
framing rules, and competition among firms will not be able to ensure that tracking defaults work 
well. 
A.  HOW FIRMS COULD MAKE TRACKING DEFAULTS FAIL 
Even with altering and framing rules in place intended to encourage consumers to make well-
informed decisions that reflect their preferences, firms will have ample opportunities to make these 
defaults fail. 
1.  Erect, Eliminate, or Invert Transaction Barriers  
a. Costs: If Track-Me were to become a full-fledged default, firms would attempt to increase the 
transaction costs that incline consumers toward the default. Regardless of altering rules constraining 
the cost of opting out, the process would still need to be completed for each browser, program, and 
device  through  which  the  consumer  is  tracked.  If  a  consumer  wanted  to  vindicate  fine-grained WHY NOT PRIVACY BY DEFAULT NOV3.DOCX  11/4/13 12:50 PM 
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preferences,  the  number  of  firms  from  which  the  consumer  would  need  to  opt  out—on  each 
browser  on  each  device  the  consumer  uses—would  vastly  exceed  the  number  of  financial 
institutions  with  which  consumers  might  consider  exercising  their  financial  information  opt-out 
rights. One reporter counted over 100 companies that tracked her online in a 36-hour period of 
ordinary web use.
225 
If Do-Not-Track were the default, firms might take a cue from the methods used by banks to 
convince accountholders to opt out of the overdraft default. When faced with a consumer who has 
not opted out of a Do-Not-Track default (or who has opted out of a Track-Me default), a website, 
program, or device might minimize the costs of opting out by offering the consumer a one-click 
opt-out method. Alternatively, firms might equalize the costs of opting out or sticking with the 
default by presenting the consumer with two choices—to opt out or not to opt out—and require the 
consumer to click one of those two before continuing.  
Firms could also make opting out of the Track-Me default or failing to opt out of a Do-Not-
Track default costly in more tangible ways. First, if legally permitted, firms might give coupons and 
discounts to those who agree to tracking, making it more immediately and visibly costly to stick with 
the default than to opt out.
226 Many firms would condition all access to content, apps, and other 
services on consumers being in the tracked position.
227 When the Netherlands made Do-Not-Track 
the  default  for  websites,  Dutch  websites  placed  a  pop-up  dialog  box  between  consumers  and 
website content, requiring users to accept all cookies to access the websites.
228 The Dutch Parliament 
found that these “cookies walls” led to “mindless clicking of ‘I accept’ buttons.”
229  
If the law were to prohibit differential treatment of consumers who do not agree to be tracked, 
firms might impose subtle costs on consumers who do not agree to be tracked. For example, firms 
might inundate consumers with marketing that, like the bank opt-out marketing, only stops if the 
consumer opts out. They might place a complex login process between the website’s content and 
users who are not in a Track-Me position, just as banks require accountholders who have not opted 
out of the overdraft default to click through a pop-up dialog box asking them to opt out before they 
can access online banking. Consumers would soon realize that they can avoid the delay of having to 
click through this screen by agreeing to be tracked, and would soon click “I agree to be tracked” 
buttons reflexively (meaning it would require more effort to override the reflex and not click the 
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button  than  to  click  it),  just  as  they  click  “I  have  read  and  agreed  to  the  terms  of  service” 
reflexively.
230  
Even more subtle costs and perks are possible. Take a default for behavioral advertising. Rather 
than  contextual  advertising  (showing  consumers  ads  based  on  the  content  the  consumer  is 
accessing),  firms  could  show  a  steady  stream  of  particularly  annoying  ads  (e.g.,  ads  that  cover 
content, ads that take a long time to load and play, ads with lots of distracting movement and noise, 
ads for unpleasant products) to anyone who is not in the Track-Me position. It might take a bit of 
time,  but  consumers  would  eventually  determine  that  they  could  avoid  these  by  consenting  to 
tracking.  
b.  Confusion.  Second,  firms  will  have  no  trouble  turning  confusion  to  their  advantage.  The 
proposed default schemes under discussion today at the W3C and the FTC consist of a complex mix 
of  Track-Me  defaults,  Do-Not-Track  defaults,  and  unalterable  Track-Me  positions,  much  as 
overdraft regulation makes no overdraft coverage for ATM and nonrecurring debit transactions the 
default but permits banks to set overdraft coverage for checks and recurring debit transactions as an 
unalterable part of consumer checking accounts. 
Even if altering rules were to require the opt-out process to consist of a simple, easy-to-use 
setting  change  at  the  browser  or  device  level,  firms  might  place  the  following  choices  before 
consumers: “Click here to opt in to our Privacy Policy” or “Click here to opt out of our Privacy 
Policy.” This is similar to bank overdraft marketing discussed above that asks accountholders to 
“opt in” to the bank’s “courtesy pay” or similarly beneficial-sounding program or “opt out” of the 
program.
231  Most consumers will assume that a “privacy policy” means that the firm will not share 
their information.
232 If regulators were to prohibit calling a policy that permits tracking a “privacy” 
policy, firms would find other confusing labels, such as a “Know Your Customer Policy” or a 
“Personalized Settings Policy.”  
Further, regardless of how “clear and conspicuous” framing rules attempt to make a Track-Me 
default  and  the  option  to  opt-out,  firms  will  ensure  that  many  consumers  do  not  notice  the 
information, effectively rendering the option to opt-out invisible. It might seem that material on a 
device screen would be more visible than a fine-print paper financial information opt-out notice that 
moves quickly from the mailbox to the trash bin. But websites are frequently cluttered material the 
user is not interested in, and part of the skill of using the web is learning how to mentally screen out 
this content. Website design is so flexible that even reasonably detailed framing rules about font size, 
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positioning, and the like are unlikely to be effective. COPPA, for example, requires that privacy 
policies for children’s websites be positioned prominently, yet they are frequently surrounded by 
other  materials  that  draw  users’  attention  away.
233 One  set  of  lab  experiments  found  that  while 
reminding  people  about  privacy  increases  privacy-protective  behavior,  even  briefly  redirecting 
consumers’ attention with a fifteen second delay between the disclosure and the privacy-related 
choice was enough to negate the effects of the disclosure.
 234 Finally, some device screens (e.g., 
mobile phones) are small, such that some content may not fall within the viewing area, particularly if 
firms do not want it to fall within the viewing area.
235   
For Do-Not-Track defaults, firms might switch the default rule in the fine print “terms of 
service.” This would make the fact that the consumer has opted out invisible to the consumers who 
ignore the fine print, and impose transaction costs on those who take the time to read the fine print. 
In contrast, if altering rules were to require consumers to take an affirmative action to opt out of a 
Do-Not-Track  default,  firms  would  make  the  process  for  opting  out  visible,  perhaps  even 
annoyingly so, as banks did with continual reminders that accountholders could opt out of the 
overdraft default.  
c. Futility. Third, consumers likely would not be permitted to avoid all tracking for all purposes; 
firms  will  continue  to  track  for  “permissible  purposes”  even  those  who  have  opted  out.  The 
financial information defaults present the same problem. Even if a consumer has opted out to the 
fullest extent, financial institutions can continue to share information with joint marketing or other 
service providers, to share “other” information with affiliates for non-marketing purposes, and “as 
[further] permitted by law.”
236 Just as opting out of sharing in the financial information context, this 
may leave consumers with a sense that resisting tracking is futile. 
2.  Harness Judgment and Decision Biases 
Salience effects. Firms facing a Track-Me default will no doubt work to keep its salience low, and 
firms facing a Do-Not-Track default will make the option to opt out salient.  
For a Track-Me default, framing rules might increase the salience of the default and opt-out 
choice somewhat, especially if media coverage of a new law about tracking raises awareness of the 
possibility of opting out in the abstract. However, firms can easily place an interruption between the 
provision of any required disclosure about tracking and the consumer’s further interaction with the 
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website  or  device,  diverting  consumer  attention  and  destroying  the  salience  of  the  required 
disclosure.
237 Even without an interruption,  at the concrete moment when consumers are using the 
app, website, or device, they are likely to be focused on something else, just as a consumer engaging 
in a financial transaction is attending to the transaction and not the information sharing implications. 
For a Do-Not-Track default, firms might interrupt consumer use of apps, websites, or devices with 
pop-up  screens  or  similar  barriers  so  that  consumer  focus  is  diverted  to  the  tracking  decision. 
Alternatively, the same repeated presentation of an “I agree to be tracked” button that would lower 
the transaction costs of opting out by inducing reflexive clicks could also reduce the salience of the 
option not to opt out, in that mindlessly clicking consumers will not give this option consideration. 
Omission Bias. Omission bias that favors tracking today would continue to do so under a full-
fledged Track-Me default scheme. Given that consumers’ current position is generally Track-Me, if 
this  default  were  imposed,  firms  could  encourage  the  operation  of  the  bias  by  emphasizing  to 
consumers that nothing has changed and they need not take any action.  
In contrast, firms facing a Do-Not-Track default will work to overcome the omission bias, 
perhaps by placing consumers in a forced choice scenario, just as banks do with the overdraft 
default. Without the option to do nothing, omission bias would not favor the default. Even if 
framing rules prevented firms from forcing consumers to choose between the default and opting 
out, firms might borrow from bank marketing materials that state or imply that consumers “must” 
take action, so that inaction no longer appears to be a blameless omission. 
Loss Aversion. Under a Track-Me default regime, firms are likely to encourage consumers to treat 
the default as the reference point against which gains and losses ought to be measured and as the 
position  with  which  consumers  are  currently  endowed.  Just  as  financial  institutions  remind 
consumers that sticking with the default allows banks to “maintain” excellent service and opting out 
could disrupt that service, firms might characterize Track-Me as the position in which websites, 
devices, or apps work “properly” or “as you have come to expect” and warn consumers that opting 
out could impair this functioning.   
If a Do-Not-Track default were imposed, firms could copy the marketing strategies used by 
banks to counter the overdraft default. Firms could frame opting out of the default not as losing an 
endowed position but as gaining a “personalized” service, just as banks frame opting out of the 
overdraft default as gaining a service. Given that a Do-Not-Track default would be a change from 
today’s Track-Me world, marketing materials might explicitly invoke loss aversion. Borrowing from 
bank overdraft marketing, firms might ask: “Would you like to keep” this service “personalized for 
you?”, or “Would you like to change your settings?” Just as banks asked consumers to opt out of the 
overdraft default before it became operative, under the W3C’s proposed scheme, websites or apps 
can  ask  consumers  to  agree  to  tracking  while  they  are  still  in  the  Track-Me  position,
238 thus 
encouraging  consumers  to  view  opting  out  as  keeping  the  status  quo.  Firms  currently  tracking 
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consumers might even determine which feature a consumer has used in the past and tailor the 
marketing to warn the consumer that she “could” lose that feature if she does not opt out. 
Procrastination and Decision Avoidance. Making Track-Me a true default leaves intact many of the 
triggers  for  procrastination  and  decision  avoidance  that  lock  in  the  Track-Me  position  today. 
Completely opting out would still be a multi-step process, because it would need to be performed on 
every browser on every device, and again when new browsers or devices are used. Opting out would 
not stop permissible uses of tracked information, and so consumers uncomfortable with tracking 
might  refuse  to  think  about  it  long  enough  to  opt  out.  Firm  marketing  could  encourage 
procrastination and decision avoidance by reminding consumers that the process requires many 
steps yet does not stop all tracking. Altering rules could make the opt-out process easier than it is 
today, but firms will work to ensure that the process still appears difficult. Even if framing rules 
required that firms provide consumers with brief, easily understandable descriptions of the default 
and opt-out positions, firms might surround these with voluminous impenetrable “explanations” 
just  as  institutions  do  with  respect  to  the  financial  information  defaults.  Copying  financial 
institutions again, firms could encourage procrastination by reminding consumers that they can “opt 
out anytime.” 
A Do-Not-Track default would evoke the opposite response from firms. Like banks facing the 
overdraft default, firms facing a Do-Not-Track default would probably place consumers in a forced 
choice scenario, such that procrastination and decision avoidance are not options. Firms might also 
give consumers false deadlines for opting out just as banks do, to reduce procrastination.  
Discounting. Facing a Track-Me default, firms would continue to take advantage of the fact that 
the time and effort costs of opting out, even if small, are immediate, whereas any benefits are 
uncertain and in the future. To the extent altering rules permit, firms are likely to impose additional 
immediate tangible costs of consumers who opt out of a Track-Me default, or at least threaten that 
opting out “might” have such an effect.  
If Do-Not-Track were the default, firms could make the potential costs of not opting out seem 
probable and clear, and promise immediate peace of mind as a benefit of opting out, as banks do 
with respect to the overdraft default. Imagine a marketing vignette in which a man tries to impress a 
woman by showing her a photo on his computer screen, but the woman’s attention is drawn to 
advertising that pops up on the man’s screen and implies something embarrassing about him. She 
reacts negatively and he tries in vain to claim innocence. Advertising copy might then ask “Tired of 
ads that weren’t meant for you? Opt into personalized advertising today.”  
Firms also might downplay the privacy costs of opting out, emphasizing that whatever benefits 
come with tracking are “free.” One can imagine a consumer being asked to opt out of a Do-Not-
Track default with the following copy: “Click here to activate Find-My-Phone, a new free service 
from [your wireless carrier],” accompanied by smaller print that explains that activating “Find-My-
Phone” will enable the carrier and its “partners” to geolocationally track the phone.  
Choice Bracketing. Firms could try to bracket consumer choices to bolster a Track-Me default. 
Altering rules likely would permit consumers to opt out at the browser or device level—a broadly-
bracketed decision that could lead individuals to make a decision based on the cumulative effect of 
loss of information privacy, and thus opt out. But firms would then ask consumers to opt back into WHY NOT PRIVACY BY DEFAULT?  11/4/13 12:50 PM 
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the default for “just for this one” firm, website, or app, triggering a narrowly-bracketed decision that 
favors immediate benefits over privacy concerns. 
For a Do-Not-Track default, firms might attempt to force consumers to opt out of all tracking 
to obtain a particular benefit of tracking. This would be similar to bank strategies with respect to 
overdraft, in that banks generally do not allow consumers to opt out on a transaction by transaction 
basis but instead require consumers to opt out of the default wholesale in order to obtain overdraft 
for  the  emergency  that  while  rare,  looms  large.  On  the  other  hand,  firms  are  unlikely  to  ask 
consumers to opt out at the browser or device level—that would benefit the firm’s competitors as 
well as the firm—but instead will seek consent to tracking by that particular firm, and so might 
emphasize the narrow nature of the opt out decision. 
Illusion of Control. Regardless of whether the default is Track-Me or Do-Not-Track, firms could 
stress to consumers that they are “in control” of their privacy as a way to encourage consumers to 
take on more risk, just as banks do with respect to overdraft coverage. Here, a legally-enforceable 
default might give consumers a feeling of greater control than they have today, which ironically 
could lead to even less privacy-protective behavior. Under a Track-Me default regime, firms could 
reassure consumers: “You do not need to make a choice now; because YOU are in control of your 
privacy choices, you can change your settings at any time.” Under a Do-Not-Track default regime, 
firms could reassure them: “Because YOU control your privacy choices, if you no longer wish to 
receive the benefits of our personalized services, you can always change this setting in the future.” 
Sunk Costs Fallacy. Under either a Track-Me or a Do-Not-Track default, firms could exploit the 
sunk costs fallacy to increase the magnetism of the Track-Me position, similar to what occurs with 
cellphone apps today. Rather than placing tracking walls at the start of a consumer’s interaction with 
a device or program, firms might allow consumers to use the device or program to some extent 
regardless of the consumer’s position. Then, once the consumer has sunk costs into learning to use 
the device or program, the firm could present a tracking wall to prevent further use. At that point, 
the fallacy would incline consumers to opt out of a Do-Not-Track position or back into a Track-Me 
position. 
3.  Bolster, Undermine, or Reverse Preference Formation Effects 
Implicit Advice: If a Track-Me default were adopted, firms would likely channel the implicit advice 
mechanism to their advantage and bolster it with explicit advice. They could make clear that Track-
Me is the default, emphasize that it was set by policymakers in the interests of consumers, and 
reinforce the endorsement implicit in the default position with explicit advice to stick with the 
default, as follows:  
Most people don’t like receiving a lot of advertising for products they don’t want and 
will never buy. That’s why Congress decided to make “Know Your Audience” the WHY NOT PRIVACY BY DEFAULT NOV3.DOCX  11/4/13 12:50 PM 
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default for advertising. If you’d like to change this setting, you can. But most people 
prefer to keep the default.
239 
The reference to Congress makes clear that policymakers set the default to help consumers avoid 
advertising, and implies that sticking with the default will do just this. Firms might also take the 
privacy issue on directly and surround any legally-mandated disclosures of the right to opt out with 
the same tag lines with which financial institutions surround the financial information defaults (e.g., 
“SAFEGUARDING  YOUR  PRIVACY”  and  “[WE]  TAKE[]  OUR  COMMITMENT  TO 
PROTECTING YOUR PRIVACY SERIOUSLY”).
240  
In response to a Do-Not-Track default, firms would likely defuse the implicit advice effect by 
obscuring which position is the default. Just as banks ask consumers to choose between “opting in” 
to  the  bank’s  “overdraft  protection”  and  “opting  out,”241 firms  might  ask  consumers  to  select 
between “opting in” to the firm’s “privacy policy” (where that policy effectively opts the consumer 
out of the Do-Not-Track position) or “opting out” (where “opting out” means sticking with the 
Do-Not-Track default). Firms could also counter any implicit advice with explicit advice to opt out 
of the Do-Not-Track default. Firms might suggest that their “privacy” policies were developed with 
[the consumer’s] needs in mind and advise consumers that if they opt into the firm’s privacy policy, 
they “can rest assured” that their “privacy will be respected.” Explicit advice is likely to speak louder 
than implicit advice. 
Experience: For Track-Me defaults, firms would likely emphasize that nothing has changed and 
the consumer can continue to use the program or device as she has always done if she sticks with 
the  default.  Because  any  Do-Not-Track  position  would  be  a  change,  firms  would  likely  push 
consumers to opt out before that change became effective, as banks did with the overdraft default. 
This  would  prevent  consumers  from  experiencing  the  default  and  potentially  developing  a 
preference for it. 
* * * * * 
Some of the strategies discussed above are at cross-purposes. For example, on the one hand, 
reminding people that they control their own position might encourage risk taking and thus sticking 
with a Track-Me default. On the other hand, “you are in control” marketing might make salient that 
consumers are responsible for their own positions, and thus discourage omission bias that would 
otherwise favor sticking with a Track-Me default. If a full-fledged tracking default scheme were 
adopted,  firms  would  gradually  refine  their  marketing  through  testing  a  variety  of  campaigns, 
potentially even using data gleaned from tracking to target their approaches.
242 
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to opting out as a “change” reinforces biases favoring the status quo. “Know your audience” sounds like a duty placed 
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240 See note 215, supra. (Privacy Protection, CAPITALONE) 
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B.  ALTERING RULES, FRAMING RULES, AND COMPETITION 
1.  The Limits of Altering and Framing Rules 
Firm ploys to increase or decrease the stickiness or slipperiness of defaults might seem to be 
easily  countered  with  altering  and  framing  rules.  For  example,  to  make  defaults  stickier, 
policymakers might impose costly opt-out procedures. To prevent firms from making defaults too 
sticky, policymakers might prohibit conditioning transactions on, or giving perks for, sticking with a 
default. Policymakers might require specified disclosures crafted to frame the default and opt-out 
positions in ways that harness or defuse biases. Or policymakers might require disclosures that 
convey explicit advice about whether consumers ought to stick with the default or opt out. But 
normative, legal,  and practical constraints limit these rules.  
a)  Respect for Heterogeneous Preferences 
A default regime rather than a mandate for personal information tracking is premised on the 
idea that consumers have heterogeneous preferences regarding privacy and the benefits tracking can 
provide, and that the law should respect that heterogeneity by allowing consumers to decide for 
themselves whether to be tracked. 
As a normative matter, altering rules that substantially inhibit opting out are inconsistent with 
respect for individual tracking preferences. For example, reverting defaults that require consumers to 
opt out every time they open up their browsers or fire up their mobile devices
243 might effectively 
keep consumers in the default position (provided that firms did not manage to make the opt out 
process so easy and routine that consumers would opt out mindlessly
244), but would be difficult to 
justify normatively. Even prohibiting differential treatment of consumers depending on whether 
they have agreed to be tracked,
245 while it could prevent the most blatant ways that firms might 
maneuver  consumers  into  agreeing  to  tracking,  might  also  be  normatively  problematic.  Where 
tracking currently funds the provision of the website, app, or device at issue, such a rule could have 
substantive  effects  on  the  availability  of  these  to  consumers,  particularly  consumers  that  lack 
financial means to pay with cash. Such substantive effects may be an appropriate trade-off for 
increased information privacy, but go beyond merely giving consumers notice and informed choice 
about tracking. 
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Framing rules that would be dramatic enough to be effective are also normatively problematic. 
In  a  world  cluttered  with  information  and  decisions,  commanding  attention  requires  something 
more drastic than a neutral description of the default and opt-out positions, such as those currently 
required for the financial information defaults. But imagine a mandated disclosure likening tracking 
to stalking or spying, conveyed through pictures along the lines of the graphic cigarette warnings 
recently proposed by the Food and Drug Administration.
246 While potentially effective in convincing 
consumers to stick with a Do-Not-Track default, this disclosure would be incompatible with an aim 
by  policymakers  to  allow  people  to  sort  themselves  into  their  desired  positions  freely,  with  no 
policymaker push in any particular direction. 
Framing rules that require more complex disclosures or other forms of consumer education 
might be another strategy, one that could in theory reduce consumer preference uncertainty that 
fuels  susceptibility  to  firm  framing  manipulations.  But  in  a  quickly  changing,  complex  decision 
environment,  the  utility  of  such  education  is  likely  to  be  nil.
247 Only  simple,  easily  actionable 
messages tend to be effective in public education campaigns.
248 But a policymaker who believes that 
consumers ought to take a variety of positions with respect to tracking cannot send a simple “just 
say no” or “just say yes” message. 
  b) Mis-sorting  
A further obstacle to developing more effective altering and framing rules is a practical one—
most such rules are unlikely to sort consumers well. Consider an altering rule designed to counter 
firm  manipulation  by  making  it  more  difficult  for  a  consumer  to  opt  out  of  a  Do-Not-Track 
position, without preventing opting out entirely, such as a rule requiring a consumer to send a signed 
letter through the U.S. Postal Service. Consumers who are in the habit of using traditional mail 
would find this altering rule no more than a speed bump, whereas consumers who conduct their 
lives on-line are more likely to be impeded by such a rule.  Yet there is no reason to think that more 
members of the former group ought to opt out (that is, ought to be tracked) than the latter. Or 
consider a requirement that consumers pass an on-line test of understanding of the default and opt-
out positions as a condition of opting out.  Although this process might be informative to those 
who completed it, many consumers dislike being tested and would be deterred from attempting to 
opt out on this basis.  Others have weak reading or comprehension abilities that would impair test 
performance. Yet consumers who dislike or perform poorly on written tests are not less likely to 
benefit from opting out than consumers who enjoy and perform well on written tests.   
c) Commercial Speech Doctrine Limits 
Given the likelihood that firms will engage in marketing that drives judgment and decision biases 
to favor the Track-Me position, framing rules prohibiting this type of marketing might seem an 
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appropriate response. Alternatively, framing rules might, in theory, require firms to frame the default 
and opt-out positions in particular ways. 
Under  current  First  Amendment  doctrine,  commercial  speech  has  a  substantial  degree  of 
protection.
249 Framing rules generally cannot prohibit firms from using particular speech, graphics, 
or vignettes to convey commercial messages if those messages are not misleading.
250 Although telling 
consumers they will not be tracked when they are being tracked is misleading,
251  none of the firm 
marketing ploys described above would likely be found misleading. The government is also limited 
in the disclosures that it can require firms to make. For example, while a disclosure likening tracking 
to stalking or spying might be effective in convincing consumers to stick with a Do-Not-Track 
default, forcing firms to give such a disclosure might violate current constitutional limits on the 
regulation of commercial speech.
252  
Without the ability to prevent firm speech that frames the default and opt-out positions or to 
require disclosures that can reach consumers through dramatic messages, firms have the upper hand; 
they  can  better  reach  the  consumer  at  the  point  of  decision  and  can  frame  the  decision  using 
anything short of demonstrably misleading speech. 
d) The Last Mover Wins 
Finally, practical limits on regulation will inhibit policymakers’ efforts to manipulate consumer 
judgment and decision biases or prevent firms from doing so. True, firm ploys to keep consumers in 
Track-Me defaults, move them out of Do-Not-Track defaults, or move them back into Track-Me 
defaults will sometimes fall flat or even backfire. Consumers are a diverse and fickle lot; what one 
consumer finds acceptable another finds out-of-bounds, and a single consumer might find a path-
breaking firm’s actions disquieting at first but unremarkable if the rest of the market moves in the 
same direction.
253 But firms can send a diverse set of marketing messages (informed by behavioral 
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tracking data), and only need one of these to work with any particular consumer. Firms can also 
experiment with risky approaches on a small scale, and can change course quickly.
254  
Policymakers are not nearly so agile. For example, policymakers might require that consumers be 
given disclosures that frame opting out of the default position as a loss.
255 But firms can run circles 
around disclosures.
256 Policymakers can set altering rules, but firms implementing those rules have 
the final say on how the entire opt-out process is designed.  
The legal rules can be put in place, but firms can simply work around them. An altering rule 
does not set how the default will be altered; it merely sets one aspect of that process, and firms 
control the rest, yet it is the entire process that affects the stickiness or slipperiness of the default. A 
framing rule can control one aspect of a frame, but firms can place that aspect within a larger frame 
that determines how effective the legal framing will be. If the law could respond to each firm 
maneuver—and then hold everything constant—altering rules and framing rules might be able to 
fine-tune the power of a default. But the law cannot require stasis. 
2.  Will Competition Change the Calculus? 
Is it possible that competition could do what government regulation cannot, creating a robust 
market for privacy, complete with consumers who make well-informed decisions about tracking that 
reflect their preferences? One can imagine the pitches: “With our cellphone, no one can track you”; 
“Google tracks you. We Don’t.”
257; “We’re a social network, not an advertising network.”
258 Firms 
seeking  to  compete  based  on  promises  not  to  track  consumers  would  not  be  limited  by  the 
normative, political and constitutional constraints facing lawmakers. They could unabashedly press 
the merits of privacy and the demerits of tracking and could respond quickly to their competitors’ 
marketing strategies with their own attempts to bend consumer judgment and decision biases to 
their favor. But will they? And if so, does the default matter?  
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Although some privacy-based competition has appeared in the marketplace, thus far it appears 
of limited effectiveness. A small cadre of privacy sophisticates may choose websites, apps, and 
devices based on reliable promises not to track consumers, but most consumers have difficulty 
distinguishing firms and products on privacy grounds.
259 Competition appears to be over privacy 
image  rather  than  privacy  reality.
260 For  example,  while  the  TRUSTe  privacy  certification  seal 
increases consumer trust in websites,
261 one study found that websites using this seal engage in more 
privacy-invasive practices than firms without the seal.
262 Microsoft’s recent “Scroogled” marketing 
campaign, which paints Google as a privacy-invader
263 may turn out to be mere optics; Microsoft’s 
campaign criticizes Google for tracking consumers, but Microsoft also reserves the right to track 
consumers in the fine print of its contracts.
264 Consumers who realize that privacy marketing is an 
unreliable indicator of privacy practices may treat the situation as a lemons market and assume all 
firms track them.
265  
A legal default might change this dynamic somewhat, particularly a Do-Not-Track default that 
required firms to obtain express consumer consent before tracking. In effect, a firm requesting 
consent would be admitting that it is trying to track consumers, an admission that might be clearer 
to consumers than those found today in unread privacy policies. Such an admission might help 
consumers distinguish firms based on the firms’ tracking practices, a predicate for genuine privacy-
based competition. 
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But because the returns to firms from tracking are only likely to grow,
266 it is likely to be more 
profitable for most firms to join the trackers rather than compete against them based on privacy. 
For example, online retailers might want consumers to stay in a Do-Not-Track position with respect 
to geolocational cellphone tracking to prevent their brick-and-mortar competitors from using this 
tracking to attract market share. However, online retailers are likely to want to use internet use 
tracking for their own purposes. Marketing that encourages consumers to adopt a Do-Not-Track 
position for geolocational tracking could imperil marketing efforts to keep consumers in a Track-Me 
default on the internet.  
While it is impossible to know whether a robust privacy market will develop, the “cookie wall” 
experience  in  the  Netherlands  is  instructive.  Dutch  law  made  plain  which  firms  were  tracking 
consumers online because only those firms had to ask consumers to opt out of the Do-Not-Track 
default.267 But  virtually  all  firms  (and  even  nonprofits
268)  responded  to  the  law  by  requiring 
consumers to opt out as a condition of using the firm’s website, not by competing on promises not 
to track.
269  
IV.  CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVACY POLICY BY DEFAULT 
None of this tells us whether or when Track-Me or Do-Not-Track is the best position for some 
or all consumers to be in. The benefits to society of tracking certainly exceed the costs in some 
situations. But a default scheme surrounded by firm manipulations intended to keep consumers in or 
spur consumers to the Track-Me position creates only the façade of choice, and that façade cannot 
justify the conclusion that Track-Me is the right position. To assess whether and when consumers 
ought to be tracked would require a far more difficult inquiry than checking whether a consumer has 
clicked a button opting out. 
Privacy  by  default  seems  like  an  elegant,  low-cost  way  to  resolve  concerns  about  personal 
information  tracking  without  imposing  positions  on  consumers.  Leaving  tracking  decisions  to 
individual  consumers  also  sidesteps  difficult  tradeoffs  between  incommensurate  values  and 
politically  perilous  substantive  judgment  calls  that  policymakers  would  rather  not  make.  If  all 
policymakers are aiming for with a notice-and-choice regime of information privacy defaults is to 
avoid political heat, they may succeed. But if they seek to use tracking defaults as a way to set norms, 
guide consumers to individually or socially desired positions, or inform consumers through the opt-
out decision process, they are likely to fail.  
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More generally, nudges may not be an effective way to help people make better choices about 
information privacy. Nudges can be powerful when no one is pushing back. But a push can easily 
overwhelm a nudge. Existing research showing such nudges to be effective  is performed in artificial 
conditions in which no firm that opposes the nudge has an opportunity to intervene.270 But firms 
can use the same mechanisms and conditions that make nudges work to make nudges fail. That 
nudges work in the lab shows that people’s privacy decisions are heavily influenced by framing–
which, ironically, is some evidence that nudges may not work in practice, given that firms can 
reframe nudges. For these experiments to have the external validity necessary to inform public 
policy, researchers must anticipate and account for the dynamic responses of firms to the proposed 
nudges.
271 
Yet the broader effects of tracking defaults on the politics of information privacy are uncertain. 
On the one hand, tracking defaults could be a useful, collectively educative political way station on 
the road to better information privacy regulation.  A default makes tracking more visible than it 
would  be  were  Track-Me  the  only  option.  While  tracking  defaults  are  unlikely  to  directly  lead 
individuals to make well-informed decisions, at the societal level, defaults could foment discussion 
and  debate  that  inform  the  populace.
272 In  turn,  this  could  create  political  pressure  for  better 
regulation.  
On the other hand, Do-Not-Track defaults might delay or derail better information privacy 
regulation, for two reasons.  
First, by creating the façade of robust choice, courts, commentators, and consumers themselves 
are more likely to blame consumers for any adverse consequences that might flow from sticking 
with  the  default  or  from  opting  out.  Experience  with  opting  out  of  the  civil  justice  system  is 
instructive here. Some sellers, after placing a clause opting out of the civil justice system and into 
arbitration in the fine print of their standard form consumer contracts, then permit consumers to 
“opt  out”  of  the  waiver  (and  thus  opt  back  into  the  legal  default)  while  keeping  the  good  or 
service.
273 These firms have apparently calculated that the costs to the firms of the few consumers 
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who will actually exercise this choice are well worth the benefits the firms receive. These benefits 
could include deterring self-blaming consumers from challenging the fine print clauses, convincing 
courts that the contracts cannot be unconscionable if consumers can opt out of these clauses,
274 or 
arguing in the political process that substantive regulation of these clauses is unnecessary because 
consumers can opt out. So too in the privacy realm, Track-Me defaults with which consumers stick 
en  masse  and  Do-Not-Track  defaults  from  which  consumers  opt  out  en  masse  might  defuse 
pressure, whether directly from consumers or through the courts or the political process, for more 
meaningful reform. 
Second, a notice-and-choice regime of defaults not only reflects the current understanding of 
privacy as an individual choice, but re-inscribes it. The model conveys the message that the problem 
is one of accommodating heterogeneous consumer privacy preferences or heterogeneous consumer 
calculi about the right tradeoff to make between their privacy preferences and the value they place 
on the benefits tracking can provide. Other conceptions—for example, as a conflict between the 
privacy required for individual experimentation, reflection, and flourishing necessary for innovation 
and  a  liberal  democratic  society
275 and  the  utility  of  the  free  flow  of  personal  information  to 
society
276—might lead to different policy responses. But it may be that so long as privacy continues 
to be understood as a right of individuals “to determine for themselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to others,”
277 better forms of regulation will remain 
unimagined. 
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